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 The seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1973) sparked an interest in the biases that 
govern decision-making, notably due to their findings on adults’ tendency to neglect base-rate 
information (i.e., prior probability) when it conflicts with social information (e.g., a personality 
description, or testimony information). Though research over the past 45 years uncovered the 
conditions that lead to base-rate neglect, very little has investigated the origins of these biases. 
Young children can use base-rate and social information on their own, but their ability to 
integrate this information remains poorly understood. Do children show a preference for social 
information as soon as they are able to use it? Or, does their preference for social information 
develop over time? The current thesis explores 4- to 6-year-old children’s ability to integrate 
base-rate and social information, providing insight into the origins of base-rate neglect. 
  In three projects, I assessed young children’s ability to integrate base-rate and social 
information. A first project investigated children’s use of base-rate information when it 
conflicted with individuating information (i.e., a personality description). Typically, adults 
classify an individual by evaluating how well the individuating information matches a 
stereotypical member of each social group, underusing prior base-rates of the groups in their 
decision. Using stereotypes familiar to young children, I presented them with an 8:2 base-rate of 
characters (e.g., 8 nice, 2 mean). One character was randomly selected from the group, with its 
membership unknown, and children were given a short personality description. By age 6, 
children performed similarly to adults and over relied on individuating information. Notably, 4-
year-olds preferred base-rates more than the older age groups. I further explored these age 
differences in a second project that manipulated the quality of the base-rate and individuating 
information given. Six-year-olds’ use of base-rates varied with manipulations depending on the 
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strength of the available individuating information. However, 4-year-olds consistently used base-
rates across manipulations, even in situations where it would be reasonable to rely on the 
individuating information. Thus, children seem to initially show a preference for base-rate 
information and develop a bias toward individuating information by the age of 6, though attempt 
to reconcile individuating information with base-rates. A third project extended my findings to 
another type of social information. I presented children with testimony information from a 
witness that conflicted with base-rates. Rather than integrating information, adults typically use 
the witness’ accuracy alone, thus neglecting base-rates. Here, 4- and 5-year-olds relied 
exclusively on an accurate witness, but they integrated information when the witness was less 
accurate. For young children, testimony from a witness is a strong cue, even stronger than 
stereotypical information. 
 With findings from the youngest age group tested to date, my dissertation provides 
evidence that heuristic strategies strengthen with development and vary depending on the type of 
social information provided. These findings highlight the importance of research on the role of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 On a daily basis, human decision-makers effortlessly make complex inferences based on 
relatively limited or incomplete information. Probabilistic information about prior likelihoods 
can help us predict future events. Subtle social cues allow us to make general inferences about 
one’s personality and behaviour. Remembering how accurate someone was in the past allows us 
to determine if we should trust their account of an event. Though these processes are quite 
complex in and of themselves, we are almost never in situations where only one piece of 
information is relevant to our judgment. That is, we are often faced with the challenge of 
integrating and properly weighing, or choosing between, multiple pieces of information, which 
complicates our decisions even further.  
In their seminal work, Kahneman and Tversky (1973; 1981) presented adult participants 
with various problems that tasked them with integrating base-rate (i.e., prior probability) and 
social information (e.g., a personality description, or testimony). Instead of properly weighing 
base-rate information in their responses, adults tended to underuse base-rates and relied more 
heavily on the conflicting piece of social information. Though much research has investigated 
the features of these problems that lead adults to neglect base-rates, very little has explored the 
developmental origins of this bias. I address this gap in the literature and explore the origins of 
these biases by investigating young children’s ability to integrate base-rates and social 
information. I attempt to address questions that elucidate the developmental origins of heuristic 
reasoning, which provides important theoretical implications for dual process theories of 
cognition. Notably, it is unknown if children show a preference for social information, over base-
rates, as soon as they are able to use social information, or if experience plays a role in 
strengthening these biases over time.   
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 This chapter provides an overview of children’s requisite skills and their ability to 
integrate numerical and social information, which must be established before addressing 
questions about the origins of base-rate neglect. I begin by discussing young children’s ability to 
use base-rate information and improvements in probabilistic reasoning with development. Next, I 
review the literature on children’s ability to use social information in their inferences and age-
related improvements in these abilities. Finally, I discuss the paucity of research on children’s 
ability to integrate these types of information and highlight important remaining questions that I 
explore empirically in this dissertation.  
Children’s Use of Statistical and Probabilistic Information 
 Our environments are often stochastic and unpredictable. We may never predict, with 
certainty, the outcome of an event, though probabilistic information can help us make a best 
guess. Moreover, the statistical structures of our environments are dynamic in the sense that they 
can change. For instance, if you are foraging for berries, you may find that particular trees yield 
more berries than others. However, the abundance of fruit may dwindle based on other factors, 
such as an increase in competitors foraging from those more prolific sources. By considering 
these factors, you can update your representation of the availability of berries from each tree, and 
can make changes to your foraging behaviour. Remarkably, humans are sensitive to statistical, 
proportional, and probabilistic data and use this information to detect structures in their 
environments, even within the first year of life. Tracking the co-occurrences of linguistic and 
visual events helps infants make sense of the “blooming, buzzing confusion” (James, 1890) 
intrinsic in their environments, which are often complex, dynamic, and contain large amounts of 
data and accompanying noise. This powerful statistical learning mechanism supports infants’ 
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development of language, recognition of objects, and acquisition of social behaviours (Saffran & 
Kirkham, 2018).  
Probabilistic Reasoning in Infancy 
 Intuitions about probabilistic events emerge early in development. Findings from the 
violation-of-expectation (VOE) looking-time paradigm have established that probabilistic 
reasoning emerges within the first year of life, as infants look longer at events that they find 
novel or unexpected. Remarkably, 12-month-old infants are able to predict a future event based 
on a probabilistic distribution (Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 2007). Infants are shown a 
lottery machine device that contains three yellow objects and one blue object. The objects 
bounce around the machine to familiarize the infants with the distribution, and then the machine 
is briefly occluded while an object exits the device. Infants’ looking times reveal that they expect 
one of the three yellow objects to exit, since they look longer when a blue object exits. Thus, 
infants use the distribution of objects to make inferences regarding the most probable outcome, 
expecting a yellow object to exit since a majority object is most likely to be sampled (Téglás et 
al., 2007). Moreover, when shown a large array of objects, infants as young as 6 months of age 
expect a sample to resemble its population (Denison, Reed, & Xu, 2013; Xu & Garcia, 2008).  
 Infants use probabilistic information to predict the outcome of a single random draw and 
explicitly use this information to inform their choices (Denison & Xu, 2010; Denison & Xu, 
2014). Two objects (i.e., a pink lollipop adorned with stickers, and an undecorated black 
lollipop) are placed in front of the infant and the experimenter encourages them to crawl or walk 
toward an object. By choosing an object, the infant confirms their preference, and this object 
becomes the target object on subsequent test trials. Next, participants are shown two populations 
containing different mixtures of target and non-target objects (e.g., Population A contains 75% 
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target objects, Population B contains 25% target objects). After the infant is familiarized to the 
populations, the experimenter covers the containers and draws an object from each population. 
The coloured portion of the lollipop is covered by the experimenter’s hand while she places it in 
an opaque cup. Once in the cup, the lollipop stick remains in view as a reminder to the infant that 
there is an object in the cup. After the experimenter has sampled the objects, she places the cups 
closer to the infant and encourages them to choose a sample. By 10 months of age, infants select 
the sample taken from the population with the higher proportion of target objects, suggesting that 
they use the distribution of target to non-target objects to inform their choices.  
Probabilistic Reasoning in Childhood 
 Infants consistently use base-rate information to inform their predictions about future 
events, demonstrating their intuitive understanding of probability. How do these abilities develop 
throughout childhood? Piaget and Inhelder’s seminal work on children’s explicit intuitions about 
chance was the first empirical investigation of 5- to 12-year-old children’s understanding of 
probability. These findings suggested children were unable to use probabilistic information in 
their decisions until quite late in childhood (Piaget & Inhelder, 1975). Piaget and Inhelder first 
familiarized children with a population of coloured beads by displaying them clearly on a tray. 
The beads were then placed in an opaque bag and shaken. The experimenter asked the child 
which colour they were more likely to get if they drew an object from the bag without looking. 
The youngest children in the sample did not systematically base their responses on the proportion 
of colours. Children around eight years of age used the proportion of colours to determine which 
object was more likely to be sampled, though it was not until age 11 that children understood 
how to update the distribution once objects were sampled without replacement (Bryant & Nunes, 
2012; Yost, Siegel, & Andrews, 1962).  
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 However, subsequent research provides a different picture of young children’s 
understanding of probability, suggesting that Piaget and Inhelder’s methods hindered their 
performance. This method placed high verbal comprehension demands on the youngest children, 
who may have had difficulty interpreting the test question. Children’s performance was also 
contingent on their productive verbal abilities, because their responses were coded as correct 
only if they explicitly mentioned the proportion of objects. More recent variations on this design, 
using age-appropriate test questions and less stringent scoring criteria (i.e., coding a response as 
correct if a child indicates the more probable colour), have shown that young children use base-
rate information to predict outcomes, indicating that even 3- and 4-year-olds use basic 
proportional comparisons to inform their decisions (Denison, Konopczynski, Garcia, & Xu, 
2006; Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2013; Gualtieri & Denison, 2019; Yost et al., 
1962).   
 In concordance with Piaget and Inhelder’s findings, recent studies have shown that 
probabilistic reasoning abilities improve with age (Falk, Yudilevich-Assouline, & Elstein, 2012; 
Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008; Girotto, Fontanari, Gonzalez, Vallortigara, & Blaye, 2016; Gualtieri 
& Denison, 2019; O'Grady & Xu, 2019). Importantly, these age differences occur in the absence 
of formal schooling of probabilistic concepts, suggesting that children’s ability to extract and 
compute proportions naturally becomes more precise over the course of development. For 
instance, children’s use of shortcuts in their probabilistic reasoning decreases with development, 
with older children primarily opting to compute and compare proportions of objects in lieu of 
solely relying on absolute quantities, which does not always produce correct responses (Bryant & 
Nunes, 2012; Falk et al., 2012; Girotto et al., 2016; O'Grady & Xu, 2019). Children’s ability to 
make more complex comparisons with closer relative likelihoods (i.e., comparing proportions 
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that are closer together, which are more difficult to visually discriminate) becomes more precise 
with age (Falk et al., 2012; O'Grady & Xu, 2019). More sophisticated reasoning abilities, such as 
integrating base-rate information with additional case-specific evidence, also improves with 
development (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008). In these problems, children are shown four squares 
and four circles that are then placed into an opaque bag. All of the squares are black, while one 
circle is black and the remaining three circles are white. When asked which colour is more likely 
to be sampled, children as young as five correctly report that black is the more probable colour. 
The researcher then reaches into the bag to sample an object and reports that they believe they 
are holding a circle. Children’s ability to update their response to reflect the more probable 
colour of circles improves with age.   
 In sum, infants and young children are proficient in using probabilistic information in 
their decisions, fine-tuning this ability with age. Over the course of development, children are 
able to make more complex comparisons and even consider additional information when making 
these inferences, including preferences and goals (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Ma & Xu, 
2011). From this, one may wonder why adults neglect base-rate information in their judgments. 
If humans become more adept at using probabilistic information, integrating base-rate 
information into one’s decisions should be effortless by adulthood. However, it is important to 
note that adults’ base-rate neglect often occurs when base-rates are presented in tandem with 
competing social information. In the next section, I discuss how our proclivity to use different 
types of social information develops during childhood. 
Children’s Use of Social Information 
 Although statistical and probabilistic data from the environment underpins much of 
infants’ and children’s learning, social input is equally critical in children’s acquisition of 
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numerous concepts (Gelman, 2009; Vygotski, 1929). The types of social information children 
use in their inferences and the various ways in which information is socially transmitted to young 
learners contribute to the multifaceted nature of children’s social cognition. In general, humans 
exhibit fairly stable traits and behaviours over time, which allows us to make general inferences 
about a social partner’s personality, goals, and attitudes (Jones, 1979; Trope & Higgins, 1993). 
However, pre-existing knowledge and beliefs from our culture can affect these inferences. That 
is, instead of tracking the behaviour, traits, and proclivities of every person we meet, we tend to 
categorize others based on certain features they possess. This leads to stereotyped inferences 
constructed from our representation of the social category or group an individual belongs to 
(Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001). These concepts are cultural in nature, and are thus learned via 
communication within our social groups (Over & McCall, 2018). Transmitting knowledge 
between individuals is a defining characteristic of human cognition and communication, crucial 
to our acquisition of various concepts that cannot be learned through direct observation, such as 
various scientific and cultural concepts (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & 
Jaswal, 2018; Harris & Koenig, 2006). For instance, children’s own observations about the shape 
of the Earth provide them with data that suggests the Earth is flat. To correct their understanding, 
children incorporate testimony from others into their representation. Concepts that are important 
to a child’s culture, such as religion and the afterlife, are also acquired via testimony information 
due to the abstract nature of these phenomena (Harris & Koenig, 2006).  
Children’s Social Inferences 
Trait-based Inferences.  
 Much of our world is social in nature, and our interactions with others are at the crux of 
human social cognition. Trait attributions play an important role in adult social cognition. The 
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internal, stable nature of traits allows adults to make inferences about others’ thoughts, goals, 
and proclivities, which are crucial to their predictions and expectations about individuals (Jones, 
1979; Trope & Higgins, 1993). The ease with which Western adults use trait information in their 
inferences is illustrated by the fundamental attribution error, wherein adults readily explain 
behaviours in terms of internal traits and characteristics, and underestimate the role of context 
and situational factors in behaviour (Jones & Harris, 1967).     
 Although adults readily use trait information in their inferences, the development of 
children’s understanding of traits is quite nuanced. By around the age of 4, young children are 
proficient in using social information to generate trait-based inferences. Young children use trait 
labels to make inferences about one’s behaviour, and, conversely, use behaviour to make 
inferences about one’s traits (Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Boseovski, Chiu, & Marcovitch, 2013; 
Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Gonzalez, Zosuls, & Ruble, 2010; Heyman & Gelman, 2000; Liu, 
Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). With age, children generate trait-based inferences from fewer 
instances of trait-consistent behaviour. In particular, 3-year-olds often require multiple examples 
of behaviour before they can make an inference, though 5- and 6-year-olds can make an 
inference after one example (Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Boseovski et al., 2013).  
 Further, young children have trouble using behavioural information to predict future, 
trait-consistent, behaviours, and make stronger inferences when trait labels are provided instead 
of trait-relevant behaviours (Boseovski et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2007). While children are 
developing an understanding of traits and their role in predicting consistent behaviour, the use of 
labels highlights their stable nature (Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Gonzalez et al., 2010; Liu et al., 
2007). That is, the language used to describe a characteristic can facilitate children’s 
expectations about its stability over time. If a novel characteristic is described in terms of a noun 
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(e.g., “Rose is a carrot-eater”), young children believe that the characteristic is more stable and 
consistent over time than if it was described using a verbal-predicate (e.g., “Rose eats carrots 
whenever she can”; Gelman & Heyman, 1999). Moreover, young children are more likely to 
make trait-based inferences if trait information is described categorically rather than 
continuously. Adults and older children show an appreciation for the continuous nature of traits, 
recognizing that different people possess varying degrees of a particular characteristic (e.g., 
some people are a little bit shy, while others are very shy). Young children are more adept at 
making trait-based inferences when the information is presented categorically (e.g., shy versus 
outgoing) rather than continuously (e.g., a little bit shy or very shy), while they are developing 
their understanding of the dimensional nature of traits (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Thus, children 
first recognize trait labels and apply them categorically when making inferences. With 
development, children’s inferences become more sophisticated as they appreciate the 
dimensional nature of traits (Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Gonzalez et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2007).   
 Finally, it should be noted that young children’s trait attributions are more advanced than 
simple evaluations of character. Although young children’s trait-based inferences correlate with 
their evaluative ratings of an individual as “good” or “bad” (e.g., a nice person is rated as 
“good”, a mean or selfish person is rated as “bad”), children are able to make trait-based 
inferences that are not mediated by their global evaluations. For instance, children tend to rate 
shyness as a “neutral” trait (i.e., people who are shy are not simply “good” or “bad”), but they 
can still make trait-based inferences about a shy character’s behaviour (Liu et al., 2007). Thus, 
although children are still developing their understanding of traits, they recognize that these are 
separate characteristics from evaluations of general goodness or badness.   
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 In sum, young children are able to use trait information in their inferences, though this 
ability becomes more sophisticated over the course of development. Young children show an 
early appreciation for trait labels, readily drawing inferences about traits from relevant 
behaviours, and vice versa. With age and experience, children need less information to draw 
these inferences and they develop a more adult-like understanding of the dimensional nature of 
traits. The ability to draw inferences based on traits and behaviours is pivotal to navigating social 
environments and interacting with others. However, instead of tracking individual traits, abilities, 
and behaviours for every person they encounter, adults and children form representations of 
social groups that inform them about the “typical” features their culture expects each member to 
possess. Thus, we often make inferences about an individual’s personality and behaviour based 
on our representation of a social group. Although this tendency to categorize others can facilitate 
more efficient navigation of social environments, it often leads to biased inferences that are 
based on very limited information about an individual. Next, I discuss the use of stereotype 
information and representations of social groups during early childhood. 
Stereotype-based Inferences. 
 Our social cognition is largely shaped by our culture. Notably, we form culturally-based 
representations about social groups that allow us to quickly categorize others based on particular 
aspects of their identity, such as their gender, religion, ethnicity, or occupation. Via 
enculturation, we create a representation of the social category that includes the characteristics 
we believe, and expect, members of each group to possess. Our acquisition of social categories 
across a variety of contexts suggest that we are predisposed to categorizing others. These 
tendencies emerge early in development and play a significant role in our efficient navigation of 
social environments (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Over & McCall, 2018; Shutts, 2013; Shutts, 2015). 
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The trade-off of this efficiency is that these representations leave little room for recognizing the 
differences among individuals within a social group (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001; Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006). 
 Although attitudes and beliefs about various social groups are acquired early in childhood 
(Over & McCall, 2018), gender is a particularly salient social category for young children 
(Arthur, Bigler, Liben, Gelman, & Ruble, 2008; Bigler & Liben, 2007; Shutts, 2013; Shutts, 
2015). Because gender can often be perceptually discriminated by certain aspects of one’s 
appearance (e.g., hair, makeup, clothing), children’s classification of category members becomes 
more practiced with age, which in turn strengthens their tendency to categorize members 
automatically. Moreover, through the use of gendered pronouns, gender is a social category that 
is often highlighted in speech. From referring to students as “boys and girls”, to asking students 
to use different bathrooms based on gender, aspects of children’s environments provide clues 
that gender is an important social grouping, which may lead children to track the distribution of 
gender in their social environments. For instance, young children in early child-care settings may 
notice that most, if not all, of their teachers are female. Children may also notice that certain 
activities, such as dance class, contain a gender imbalance among students, and that certain toys 
are preferred more by a particular gender, such as dolls or trucks. By noticing the imbalance 
within these contexts, children’s attention is directed to the gender of individuals, thus making it 
a salient feature of these environments (Arthur et al., 2008; Bigler & Liben, 2007). Finally, 
children’s entertainment (e.g., books, television shows, movies) reinforces cultural gender 
stereotypes in their depictions of male and female characters (Over & McCall, 2018).  
 Children use gender information to inform their behaviour and social preferences early in 
childhood. Gender information first affects preschoolers’ social preferences, as three-year-olds 
 12 
often report favouritism toward members of their own gender (Martin & Ruble, 2004; Shutts, 
2013; Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013; Shutts, 2015). Notably, children’s preference for members 
of their own gender emerges across a variety of cultures (e.g., North America, Africa, Europe, 
South America), whereas other preferences, such as those based on race, tend to emerge later in 
development and are more culturally determined (Shutts, 2013; Shutts, 2015). Following this 
initial bias in children’s own preferences, gender information impacts children’s inferences about 
social affiliations. Four- to six-year-old children believe other children are more likely to have 
friends of the same gender rather than the opposite gender, and their tendency to believe 
friendship affiliations are based on gender increases with age during this period (Arthur et al., 
2008; Shutts et al., 2013).  
 Thus, young children use gender information to make inferences about social affiliations. 
However, inferences about social affiliation do not reveal when children acquire cultural beliefs 
related to gender roles and stereotypes, and how these beliefs impact their social cognition. 
Children possess beliefs about gender quite early in development, with the toddler and preschool 
years critical to their acquisition of gender stereotypes (Martin & Ruble, 2004; Trautner et al., 
2005). By the preschool years, children possess stereotypes regarding gender-typical traits, 
behaviours, roles, and occupations, and they build on this knowledge during the early childhood 
years (Edelbrock & Sugawara, 1978; Kuhn, Nash, & Brucken, 1978; Martin & Little, 1990). By 
3 years of age, children reference gender stereotypes when justifying other children’s 
preferences, though they rarely mention their gender when explaining their own preferences 
(Arthur et al., 2008; Eisenberg, Murray, & Hite, 1982). Without any prior knowledge of a child’s 
toy preferences, children use gender to infer that other children prefer to play with toys that 
accord with gender stereotypes. Throughout early childhood, children acquire more gender-
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related information and apply it to their inferences about others, rigidly adhering to these 
stereotypes up until the age of 7, when they begin to view gender as a more flexible feature of 
one’s identity. That is, although children are increasingly exposed to gender stereotypes with 
development, they recognize that gender stereotypes are not fixed and do not perfectly predict 
behaviour (Martin & Ruble, 2004; Trautner et al., 2005).  
 Thus, gender serves as an important distinction in young children’s social environments. 
Readily forming representations of social categories aids in children’s navigation of their social 
world and affects the ease with which they draw inferences about others based on limited 
information. Children rely on different sources of information to form and update their beliefs 
about social categories. When forming their representations, children attend to statistical 
regularities that provide them with clues about how often a social group typically engages in a 
particular behaviour (Riggs, 2019). However, communication with others is an important source 
of information for young children, providing them with information about a wide range of topics, 
including social categories, cultural knowledge and traditions, and scientific concepts. Children 
readily form representations about social categories they have not encountered, using 
information gleaned from others’ testimony as the basis of their representation (Lane, Conder, & 
Rottman, 2019; Over & McCall, 2018). In the next section, I outline research on children’s 
ability to use testimony information in their learning.  
Children’s Social Learning 
 Together with perception and memory, testimony information provides human learners 
with crucial knowledge about their environments (Harris et al., 2018; Over & McCall, 2018). 
Children receive much social input in the form of testimony information, that is, via verbal 
assertions intended for the transmission of credible information (Gelman, 2009; Harris & 
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Koenig, 2006). Testimony information complements information gleaned through direct 
observations and is critical to the acquisition of scientific, cultural, and social concepts that 
cannot be acquired through first-hand experience (Harris et al., 2018; Harris & Koenig, 2006). In 
turn, this allows listeners to effortlessly update representations based on information that they 
otherwise did not encounter through their own percepts (Gelman, 2009).  
 From quite an early age, children glean explicit information from others and rely on their 
testimony as a source of information. Children often direct their questions to adults, recognizing 
that adults are a reliable source of information particularly when they encounter something that 
they cannot reconcile with their current beliefs (Harris & Koenig, 2006). However, young 
children exhibit healthy skepticism and do not simply accept every assertion, especially if the 
informant has provided them with inaccurate information in the past (Mills, 2013). One 
experimental paradigm demonstrates young children’s proficiency in discerning prior accuracy 
to determine if they should learn from an informant (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). Children are familiarized to two speakers who take turns 
naming objects. Notably, the objects during this phase are familiar to young children, allowing 
them to evaluate the speaker’s accuracy using their own knowledge of object labels. The two 
speakers are seated at a table and an object is placed between them (e.g., a ball). One of the 
speakers correctly labels the object (e.g., labels the ball “a ball”), while the other provides an 
incorrect label (e.g., labels the ball “a shoe”). Children are presented with a number of these 
trials, in which they establish that one speaker is accurate at naming objects, while the other is 
inaccurate. After the familiarization trials, participants complete test trials, in which they are 
asked to judge the accuracy of the speakers and indicate which speaker they would seek 
information from when learning about a novel object. Children’s ability to discern and generalize 
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accuracy information improves with age due to advances in children’s ability to track the 
proportion of correct and incorrect responses produced by a speaker (Pasquini et al., 2007). 
Three-year-old children have no trouble trusting a speaker who is always correct, though they 
distrust a speaker as soon as they make a single error, even if the contrasting speaker is 
consistently incorrect. For instance, 3-year-olds have trouble determining who to trust when they 
are presented a choice between a speaker who made one error and a speaker who made errors on 
all four trials. Children’s ability to track the frequency of correct and incorrect responses made 
by a single speaker improves with age. By the age of 4, children track the proportion of correct 
and incorrect responses produced by a speaker, readily comparing this information between 
speakers to determine who to trust (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007).  
 In sum, young children exhibit a healthy skepticism when learning from others, 
appropriately considering the accuracy of an informant before accepting any assertions they have 
made. This ability becomes more fine-tuned with age, as children become more proficient in 
weighing past accuracy when deciding who to seek information from. In this section, I reviewed 
the ways in which young children navigate their social environments, from tracking information 
about individuals and social groups, to representing social groups via categories, and by learning 
from others. The complexity of children’s social cognition highlights the ecological importance 
of considering multiple pieces of information in their decisions. In the next section, I turn to this 
important aspect of children’s decision-making: their ability to weigh and integrate information.  
Children’s Ability to Integrate Information 
 In our daily lives, we are seldom in situations where only one piece of information is 
relevant to a decision, so we are accustomed to weighing and integrating multiple pieces of 
information. For instance, we readily consult different sources before we decide to try a new 
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restaurant. We track the proportion of five-star to one-star reviews to get an overall estimate of 
others’ experiences. We can also read the content of each review to get a better sense of specific 
factors that may play a part in our decision, such as the quality of food, service, and price. That 
is, a restaurant might have a high overall rating, but we may notice a number of negative reviews 
mentioning very slow service. By integrating these pieces of information according to our 
perception of their relative importance, we can make more informed decisions. 
 But how does our ability to integrate information develop? Children exhibit quite 
sophisticated reasoning abilities early in development, yet in much of the aforementioned 
literature, children are presented with one piece of information or one source of knowledge and 
are not required to consider multiple pieces of information in concert. Thus, many questions 
remain regarding children’s ability integrate different sources of evidence. In their seminal work, 
Kahneman and Tversky documented adults’ tendency to overweigh social information in lieu of 
base-rates (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Although adults’ underuse of base-rates has been well-documented over the last 40 years, very 
little research explores the development of this bias. Do children integrate numerical and social 
information in their decisions, or do they prefer to rely on a specific type of information? And 
how does this weighing change over the course of development? In this section, I review the 
relatively small body of research investigating young children’s ability to integrate information.  
 Remarkably, 4-year-olds integrate testimony information with causal frequency 
information observed first-hand (Bridgers, Buchsbaum, Seiver, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2016). 
Children are shown a blicket detector and two different shaped blocks, and are told that one of 
the blocks activates the machine. Children are either given testimony from a confident informant 
who believes that they know which block activates the machine, or they are given testimony 
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from an informant who claims to be guessing. After receiving the testimony information, 
children observe a sequence of trials in which the other block more successfully activates the 
machine probabilistically (e.g., 66% of trials) or deterministically (e.g., 100% of trials). Thus, 
children observe evidence that conflicts with the informant’s testimony. Depending on the 
informant’s confidence and the statistical sequence observed, children weigh the testimony and 
base-rate information in their judgments. Children who observe a probabilistic sequence of 
events rely more on the confident informant’s testimony, though children who observe a 
deterministic sequence rely more on the causal frequency information observed first-hand.  
 Though this provides evidence that young children can integrate numerical and social 
information, this paradigm was not designed to be analogous to the classic base-rate neglect 
problems presented to adults. Children’s first-hand observations of causal evidence in a 
statistical sequence may be more salient to their decisions than a base-rate depicting a population 
of objects. Although some researchers have examined children’s use of base-rate and social 
information in adaptations of the classic problems, issues with their designs make it difficult to 
draw conclusions from this work. In these experiments, 6- to 12-year-olds were presented with a 
set of child-friendly problems inspired by the classic adult paradigm. Surprisingly, the 6- and 7-
year-old children in the sample relied more on base-rate information, leading to the somewhat 
counterintuitive conclusion that young children were “more rational” than older children and 
adults, as they experienced less base-rate neglect (Davidson, 1995; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991).  
 However, recent work has suggested that these findings were due to children’s lack of 
familiarity with the stereotype information presented (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011; Stanovich, 
West, & Toplak, 2011). That is, 6- and 7-year-old children were less familiar with the group 
stereotypes used in the problems than the older children, and thus relied on the base-rate 
 18 
information due to their inexperience with these social groups (e.g., children were presented with 
cheerleader and band member stereotypes, which are likely unfamiliar to early school-aged 
children). To investigate this claim, 5- and 8-year-olds were presented with a set of problems that 
manipulated the familiarity of the stereotype information (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011). Prior 
to data collection, group stereotypes were presented to a sample of children to establish two sets 
of problems that contained stereotypes that 5-year-olds were familiar or unfamiliar with. Using 
this problem set, the classic task was adapted for children as a card game. Cards contained a 
drawing of a person on one side (e.g., a girl), and a drawing of an object associated with a 
stereotype on the other side (e.g., a doll). In each problem, children were presented with a set of 
ten cards that depicted a 9:1 base-rate of individuals (e.g., nine boys and one girl). The 
experimenter shuffled the cards and placed them into an opaque bag. The experimenter then 
drew one card from the bag and showed the child the side with the object. Children were asked 
to indicate which character they thought was on the other side of the card. In general, 5-year-olds 
relied more on base-rates when presented with unfamiliar stereotypes, though they relied more 
on individuating information when presented with familiar stereotypes. From this, the authors 
concluded that children will use stereotypes and neglect base-rates if they are familiar with the 
presented stereotypes. I probe the validity of this interpretation closely in this dissertation. 
The Current Experiments  
 The aim of this dissertation is to explore children’s ability to integrate social and 
numerical information in problems adapted from the classic adult work on base-rate neglect. I 
developed versions of the adult problems to ensure they were suitable for use with preschool age 
children. Because children’s ability to use base-rate information was historically thought to 
emerge later in development, researchers have yet to present child-friendly versions of these 
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problems to this age group. Thus, I explored children’s ability to integrate information in the 
youngest age group tested to date. To ensure that children were able to follow my tasks, I tested 
their baseline ability to use each piece of information separately before presenting them with 
problems that included both pieces of information together. This design feature allowed me to 
explore how aspects of various problems affect children’s base-rate use at different ages, and 
how salient different types of social information are to young children’s judgments. 
 Specifically, Chapter 2 explores 3- to 6-year-old children’s ability to integrate 
information in a child-friendly version of the lawyer-engineer problem. In this problem, adults 
often over rely on case-specific, individuating information when it conflicts with base-rate 
information about a population (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Chapter 3 further explores these age differences between 4- and 6-year-olds using additional 
manipulations of the lawyer-engineer problem. Chapter 4 examines 4- and 5-year-old children’s 
ability to integrate information in a child-friendly version of the taxi-cab problem. In this 
problem, adults often over rely on testimony information when it conflicts with base-rate 
information (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
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Chapter 2: The Development of the Representativeness Heuristic in 
Young Children 
A version of this chapter appears in:  
Gualtieri, S., & Denison, S. (2018). The development of the representativeness heuristic in young 
children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 174, 60-76.  
 
 Cognitive psychologists have a long-standing interest in the biases that affect decision-
making. In their seminal work, Kahneman and Tversky established numerous cases of base-rate 
neglect. For example, in the lawyer-engineer problem, participants read a personality description 
randomly selected from a sample of lawyers and engineers. The description was of a 
conservative man who enjoyed puzzles and did not care for social issues. Participants were then 
asked how likely it was that the man was an engineer, as opposed to a lawyer. Importantly, 
participants were either told that the group from which he was sampled included 70 lawyers and 
30 engineers, or that it included 30 lawyers and 70 engineers. Despite these differences in base-
rates, participants in both conditions estimated that the man was an engineer at nearly identical 
levels. That is, people neglected base-rate information (i.e., the number of lawyers and engineers 
in the sample) and relied more heavily on individuating information (i.e., the personality 
description, which fit their representation of a typical engineer). This is termed the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) and it can lead to base-rate neglect 
and biased judgments.  
 Since the initial publication of this work, many have investigated why adults neglect 
base-rates (see Kahneman, 2011, for a review), but few have investigated when this bias 
develops. Most research on the development of base-rate neglect has focused on children over 
the age of five, as this was when basic probabilistic reasoning was thought to emerge. However, 
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we now know that preschoolers, infants, and even non-human primates can use proportional 
information in their inductive inferences (Denison et al., 2006; Denison & Xu, 2014; Kushnir et 
al., 2010; Rakoczy et al., 2014; Téglás et al., 2007; Xu & Garcia, 2008). This early emergence of 
probabilistic reasoning provides an opportunity to investigate the development of heuristics and 
reasoning biases, particularly those involving base-rates, in children younger than those 
previously tested. Therefore, one main goal of the current experiments is to examine the age at 
which children begin to neglect base-rates in favor of applying representativeness by examining 
the youngest age group tested to date, 3- to 6-year-old children.  
 Because I am testing children younger than those previously studied, it is important to 
establish whether children at each age can use each piece of information on its own to make 
predictive inferences. Some previous investigations of the representativeness heuristic in young 
children did not provide baseline measures of children’s ability to use base-rate and 
individuating information separately. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
work. In particular, previous work often overlooked young children’s knowledge of 
characteristic information, which is essential to generating a response based on the 
representativeness heuristic. For instance, although Jacobs and Potenza (1991) and Davidson 
(1995) found that 6- and 7-year-old children provided responses in line with base-rate 
information more often than older children and adults, these younger participants were presented 
with characteristic group information they were likely unfamiliar with (e.g., cheerleader and 
band member stereotypes). Thus, their increased use of base-rates likely arose from a lack of 
category information, rather than an ability to override a heuristic response with a normative one 
(Stanovich et al., 2011). This important problem was highlighted in an investigation of 5- and 8-
year-old children’s responses to base-rate problems that used both familiar and unfamiliar group 
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information (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011). The younger children provided normative 
responses only when they were unfamiliar with the presented stereotypes (and thus only had 
base-rates to rely on). This demonstrates the importance of establishing whether children have 
the relevant social information to provide a normative or a heuristic response in a particular 
paradigm. Therefore, in Experiment 1, I examine preschoolers’ use of base-rate and 
individuating information separately, to provide a foundation for interpreting their responses 
when this information is provided in tandem in Experiment 2. 
 Important variants of the lawyer-engineer problem, which manipulate the relevance of the 
social information provided, have revealed how readily adults use individuating information in 
inferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In a typical experiment, participants are given 
individuating information relevant to their classification. Relying on individuating information is 
reasonable in this context to an extent, because the information fits one of the group’s 
characteristics. Further, the pragmatics of the experimental situation might implore people to use 
individuating information more strongly than in every day reasoning (Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & 
Naderer, 1991). Investigating participants’ use of base-rates when given individuating 
information irrelevant to classification sheds light on how strongly they are committed to relying 
on it and how sensitive they are to the pragmatics of the experimental situation. In a variant of 
the lawyer-engineer problem, adults were once again given a description of an individual 
randomly selected from 70 lawyers and 30 engineers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). However, 
this individual was described as motivated, successful, and well-liked by colleagues. That is, 
participants were given individuating information that could describe either a lawyer or an 
engineer, in addition to the skewed base-rate. In this case, participants should certainly rely on 
base-rate information in their estimates and state that there is a 70% chance the person is a 
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lawyer, because the individuating information is uninformative. However, adults rate the 
likelihood of this person being an engineer at approximately 50%, neglecting base-rates and 
attempting to rely on uninformative individuating information in their response. This reveals a 
particularly strong bias in adult cognition.  
 Previous developmental studies have not manipulated the relevance of individuating 
information, leaving unknown whether children’s biases are as extensive as adults, and whether 
this changes throughout the early childhood years. Therefore, a second major goal of this work is 
to examine the pervasiveness of base-rate neglect and the representativeness heuristic in 
development by manipulating the relevance of individuating information. In Experiment 2, I 
present some children with individuating information that lacks relevance, as in the case 
described above. If children show sensitivity to base-rates in this context and only use relevant 
individuating information, this would indicate that early in development the bias is less pervasive 
and is deployed more conservatively than in adult reasoning. However, if they perform similarly 
to adults and neglect base-rates even when presented with irrelevant individuating information, 
then children’s bias toward individuating information would be more extensive than previously 
known. In another variant of the lawyer-engineer problem, adults are not given any individuating 
information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Experiment 2 will also include a condition in which 
children are provided no additional information about the individual case. Again, such a 
condition has not been explored in children, but adults typically default to base-rates in these 
cases. This condition is informative because it allows us to see whether simply placing children 
in a context in which characteristic group information is highlighted throughout a narrative 
affects their classifications and results in any base-rate neglect.  
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The Experimental Approach 
 To facilitate comparison between children’s responses and the typical adult findings, 
children in the present experiments were given problems in conditions based on Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1973) original studies. Across problems, children aged 3 to 6 were presented with 
traits (i.e., nice and mean) and stereotypes (i.e., gendered toy preferences) that children at these 
ages are likely to be familiar with (Arthur et al., 2008; Edelbrock & Sugawara, 1978; Eisenberg 
et al., 1982; Heyman & Gelman, 2000; Liu et al., 2007; Serbin & Sprafkin, 1986; Shutts, 2013; 
Trautner et al., 2005). I included a trait-based problem to mimic the adult trait-based portions of 
the occupational stereotypes, such as a person being described as “careful, conservative, and 
ambitious” for an engineer (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). I included trait labels and examples of 
behaviours in our experiments to ensure that children were given enough information to make 
inferences (Liu et al., 2007). I also included a gender-based problem because it evokes a more 
culturally embedded stereotype (which are more commonly studied than traits in the 
developmental literature on representativeness) and mimics parts of the adult problem that 
reference the kinds of activities people in different occupations might enjoy (e.g., “carpentry and 
math puzzles” for an engineer; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). I reference activities that children 
view as being preferred by different genders, such as playing dress up or playing with trucks. 
Including one problem that relies on gender stereotypes and one problem that relies on simple 
trait-based inferences provides broad insight into the role of heuristic use in cognitive 
development. Previous research has focused heavily on stereotypes and has not examined traits. I 
chose an example of each kind to determine whether children’s judgments and decisions vary 
depending on whether the problem posed involves these different types of groups or categories.  
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 In the current experiments, young children’s use of base-rate and individuating 
information in their inferences was examined using a novel paradigm. Consistent with previous 
developmental approaches to exploring base rate neglect, I use a forced-choice paradigm 
(Davidson, 1995; De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991).   
Experiment 1 
 To provide an independent assessment of whether children can use the current base-rate 
and individuating information in their inferences, Experiment 1 investigated 3- to 5-year-old 
children’s use of base-rate and individuating information when presented alone.  
Methods 
Participants. 
 In both experiments, children were tested individually in lab, at their school or daycare, 
or at a local children’s museum. The final analyses included 96 children, with 48 children in the 
base-rate condition, including 16 three-year-olds, 16 four-year-olds, and 16 five-year-olds (Mage 
= 4;4 [year;months], range = 3;0-5;11; 20 females). An additional child was tested and was 
excluded due to failing to correctly identify the majority group on both problems (see Procedure 
for details). Forty-eight children participated in the individuating condition, including 16 three-
year-olds, 16 four-year-olds, and 16 five-year-olds (Mage = 4;6, range = 3;0-5;11; 24 females). 
An additional child was tested and was excluded due to non-compliance.  
Procedure. 
 Participants in both conditions completed two problems. The experimental session was 
presented to the children on a laptop, using a PowerPoint presentation, which was narrated live 
by an experimenter. Children were told that they were going to hear about robots on another 
planet that is just like earth, and that they would answer some questions after. 
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Look, we’re at the library. There are two types of 
robots at the library. These ones wear red, and 
these ones wear purple. 
 
There are ten robots at the library today. Let’s 
count them (count). So, there are eight wearing 




Look, it’s one of the robots from the group we just 
saw! It’s wearing a white coat, so we don’t know 
what colour it is wearing. Which colour was there 
more of in the group, red or purple? What colour is 
this one wearing, red or purple? 
Figure 1. Colour problem in base-rate condition of Experiment 1. 
 Participants in the base-rate condition completed a colour and a shape problem, in 
counterbalanced order (see Figure 1 for a diagram of the base-rate condition procedure). Two 
problem-types (shape and colour) were used. In the colour problem, participants were introduced 
to two robots standing side by side at a library, one robot wearing red and another robot wearing 
purple. After establishing that the child could correctly point to a robot wearing red and one 
wearing purple, participants saw a group of ten robots at the library, eight wearing red, and two 
wearing purple. As a comprehension check, children were asked to indicate which type of robot 
there was more of. The experimenter either agreed or disagreed with the child’s answer, stating 
that there were lots of robots wearing red and few wearing purple. Following this, children saw a 
single robot wearing a white coat, making its type unclear. Children were told that this robot was 
from the group of robots they just saw. Children were asked to recall which type of robot there 
was more of in the group. Participants were then asked to indicate which type of robot they 
thought the one wearing the white coat was. This procedure was also followed for the shape 
problem, including the comprehension check; however, participants saw one type of robot 
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wearing hearts and another type of robot wearing stars. To ensure participants did not confuse 
the robots with those from the previous problem, the shape problem took place at a grocery store. 
Participants were excluded only if they did not correctly identify the majority group in the 
comprehension check for both problems.  
 
Look, we’re at the park. There are two types of robots at 
the park. The ones that wear blue are nice most of the 
time, and the ones that wear green are naughty most of the 
time. 
 
This robot is nice most of the time. If it was at a birthday 
party, it would bring flowers for the birthday robot. 
 
This robot is naughty most of the time. If it was at a 
birthday party, it would hide the presents from the birthday 
robot. 
 
Can you point to the one that is nice most of the time? 
Can you point to the one that is naughty most of the time? 
 
 
Look, it’s one of the robots from the park! It’s wearing a 
white coat, so we don’t know what colour it is wearing. 
Which colour robot was nice most of the time? Which 
colour robot was naughty most of the time? This robot likes 
to make a mess of the park and scare other robots. What 
colour is this one wearing, blue or green? 
Figure 2. Trait problem in individuating condition of Experiment 1. 
 In the individuating condition, each participant completed a trait and a gender problem in 
counterbalanced order (see Figure 2 for a diagram of the individuating condition procedure, and 
Table 1 for group and individuating information). In the trait problem, following the initial 
introduction, participants then saw two robots standing side by side at a park, one robot wearing 
blue and another wearing green. They were told that most of the time the robots wearing blue 
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were nice, and the ones wearing green were naughty. A visual manipulation, in which the 
characteristic group information mapped on to particular colours, was used so that the base-rates 
could be presented visually to the children in Experiment 2 when base-rate and group 
information are presented together1.  
 Children were given characteristic group information in the form of examples of the 
robots’ behaviours. These were included to ensure the salience of this information was equated 
with the salience (e.g., amount of time it takes to convey the information) of the base-rate 
information in the base-rate condition. Participants were asked to indicate which type of robot 
was nice most of the time, and which type of robot was naughty most of the time. Following this, 
children saw a single robot wearing a white coat, making its type unclear. Children were asked to 
recall which traits were associated with each colour. The experimenter then provided some 
individuating information about the robot wearing the white coat, which matched one of the 
traits. Half of the children heard a description of nice behaviour, while the other half of the 
children heard a description of naughty behaviour. Unlike the group information, the 
individuating information did not describe the robot as either “naughty” or “nice”; children were 
only told about the mystery robot’s behaviours which were characteristic of a person who was 
either nice or naughty. This mimics the classic adult problems, in which participants are told the 
relevant categories leading up to the final classification (lawyers and engineers) but the category 
names are not mentioned in the individuating information. Participants were asked to indicate 
which type of robot they thought the one wearing the white coat was. This procedure was also 
followed for the gender problem. To ensure participants did not confuse the robots with those 
from the previous problem, the gender problem took place at a school. 
                                               
1 Presenting base-rates visually is standard practice in developmental studies of heuristics (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011). 
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Table 1. Group and individuating information for each type in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Girl Boy Nice Mean 
Group 
information 
This robot likes 
to play with toys 
girls like most of 
the time. See, it 
has a unicorn, a 
teddy bear, and a 
doll.  
This robot likes to 
play with toys boys 
like most of the 
time. See, it has a 
dinosaur, a puppy, 
and a helicopter.  
This robot is nice 
most of the time. 
If it was at a 
birthday party, it 
would bring 
flowers for the 
birthday robot.  
This robot is 
naughty most of 
the time. If it was 
at a birthday 
party, it would 
hide the presents 





This robot likes 
to play dress up 
and house.  
This robot likes to 
play with trucks 
and trainsets.  
This robot likes 
to clean up the 
park and help its 
friend play on the 
swing.  
This robot likes 
to make a mess 




 In both conditions, the position of the two types of robots (e.g., green on the left and blue 
on the right) was counterbalanced in each problem. The experimenter always began by telling 
the child about the robot on the left. In the base-rate condition, the colour of the majority group 
was counterbalanced across both problems. The position of the majority group was also 
counterbalanced in both problems, as the majority was either presented as the first eight robots or 
the last eight robots in the group of ten. In the individuating condition, the individuating 
information given about the robot wearing the white coat was counterbalanced as representative 
of each type.  
Results 
 Only sessions in the lab were video recorded. All videos from in-lab participants were 
secondary coded, with a 100% agreement rate between the experimenter and secondary coder 
(N=65). For children in the community, transcription of the data was reliability coded for half of 
the children to ensure agreement between the hand coding and electronic data. There was 100% 
agreement between these coders.   
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Base-rate condition. 
 Children received a score of 1 on each trial for selecting the group that corresponded to 
the majority. Preliminary analyses indicated there were no effects of problem order (i.e., first 
trial, second trial) on children’s responses. Because each child completed two trials, 96 trials 
were included in the analyses. A Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) binary logistic 
regression with age (3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) and problem type (shape, colour) as 
between-subjects factors revealed a significant age by problem type interaction, Wald χ2(df = 2) 
= 9.57, p = .008. The main effects of age, Wald χ2(df = 2) = 3.48, p = .18, and problem type, 
Wald χ2(df = 1) = .05, p = .82, were not significant. Pairwise comparisons provided additional 
insight on the age by problem type interaction. The performance of 3-year-olds on shape 
problems (M = .44, SD = .51) significantly differed from 3-year-olds on the colour problems (M 
= .75, SD = 0.45; MeanDifference = .31, p = .007), 4-year-olds on the shape problems (M = .88, SD 
= 0.34; MeanDifference = .44,  p = .003), 5-year-olds on the shape problems (M = .88, SD = 0.34; 
MeanDifference = .44,  p = .003), and 5-year-olds on the colour problems (M = .88, SD = 0.44; 
MeanDifference = .44,  p = .003).  
 Recall that the goal of Experiment 1 was to establish baseline use of each type of 
information at each age. Therefore, I examined each age separately using additional GEE binary 
logistic regressions (see Figure 3 for overall means). Because three-year-old children’s 
performance differed between colour and shape problems, I examined their performance on each 
problem type separately. Three-year-olds’ performance on shape problems did not differ from 
chance, Wald χ2(df = 1) = .25, p = .62, and their performance on colour problems was marginally 
different from chance, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 3.62, p = .06. Next, I examined four- and five-year-olds’ 
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overall performance. Four-year-old, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 6.12, p = .01, and five-year-old children, 
Wald χ2(df = 2) = 6.63, p = .01, exceeded chance performance.  
Individuating condition. 
  Children received a score of 1 on each trial for selecting the group that corresponded to 
the individuating information. Preliminary analyses indicated there were no effects of problem 
order (i.e., first trial, second trial) on children’s responses. Because each child completed two 
trials, 96 trials were included in the analyses. A GEE binary logistic regression with age (3-year-
olds, 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) and problem type (gender, trait) as between-subjects factors 
revealed a significant main effect of age, Wald χ2(df = 2) = 11.89, p = .003. The main effect of 
problem type, Wald χ2(df = 1) = .002, p = .96, and the interaction between problem type and age, 
Wald χ2(df = 2) = 1.44, p = .49, were not significant. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
performance of 5-year-olds significantly differed from the performance of 3-year-olds 
(MeanDifference = -.44,  p < .001), and 4-year-olds (MeanDifference = -.25,  p = .02). 
 To further investigate development across age, children’s performance at each age was 
examined separately using GEE binary logistic regressions (see Figure 3 for overall scores). 
Five-year-old children performed above chance, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 14.73, p < .001. However, 4-
year-olds marginally exceeded chance, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 3.01, p = .08, and 3-year-olds did not 
exceed chance, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 0, p = 1.  
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Figure 3. Mean total scores for each age in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate standard error. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 established that children’s abilities to use base-rate and individuating 
information develop between 3 and 5 years. When presented with base-rate information alone, 4- 
and 5-year-old children predicted group membership at above chance levels when colour and 
shape were used to depict base-rates, while 3-year-olds predicted group membership at above 
chance levels only when different colours were used. When presented with individuating 
information alone, 5-year-old children predicted group membership at above chance levels. 
Four-year-old children were marginally different from chance, using individuating information 
to predict group membership around 70% of the time. Because 16 children were tested in each 
age group, 4-year-olds’ marginal performance may be due in part to a power issue. Although 
their performance was marginally significant, 4-year-olds seem to use individuating information 
in their inferences. Three-year-old children were unable to consistently use individuating 
information to make a predictive inference as they performed at chance in this task.  
 In sum, if a simple dimension like colour is used, children can produce a response based 
























information in their inferences but this ability appears to be more fragile than in five-year-olds. 
This is pivotal to producing responses based on the representativeness heuristic, as well as those 
from integrating base-rates and individuating information.  
Experiment 2 
 Having established children’s developing abilities to use base-rate and individuating 
information separately, children were given both base-rate and individuating information 
together. The type of individuating information provided to participants was varied in four 
between-subjects conditions. Analogous to the adult literature, one group of children was 
presented with individuating information that conflicted with base-rate information, as in the 
classic problem. Another group of children was given problems that cued the same response (i.e., 
the two pieces of information did not conflict). These easier problems establish whether children 
at each age can hold both types of information in mind while following the story and whether 
presenting evidence that points in the same direction will affect inferences in an additive way 
(see De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011).  
 I included two additional experimental conditions that have been crucial in adult 
examinations of base-rate neglect but have not been presented to children. In the irrelevant 
condition, children were presented with base-rate information along with individuating 
information that was not useful to their classification. In the adult version of this problem, 
participants were given a description of an individual who was highly skilled, motivated, and 
well-liked by colleagues (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). As this information could be indicative 
of either a lawyer or an engineer, it is rational for participants to default to base-rates in their 
estimates (i.e., produce a mean as a group that is statistically equal to 70%). However, 
participants in both base-rate conditions (30/70 and 70/30) believed there was about a 50% 
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chance that the individual was an engineer. Thus, underuse of base-rates in this condition 
suggests that participants are pulled away from base-rates by the presence of individuating 
information. Following this rationale, the irrelevant condition was included to gauge the 
pervasiveness of the bias in children. Therefore, children’s performance in this condition will be 
compared to a prediction based on base-rates to see whether their classifications differ from this 
predicted level (i.e., 80%). If they fall significantly below the base-rate prediction (towards 
chance levels, as adults have done in previous work), then this suggests that they experience 
base-rate neglect and employ representativeness very strongly. 
 In the no individuating condition, children were taken through the same narrative and 
base-rate information as in the other conditions but were given no individuating information 
when it came time to make a classification. In the classic adult problem, participants were told 
that the individual was drawn from a base-rate of lawyers and engineers (70/30 or 30/70), though 
they were not given any specific individuating information about the person they were asked to 
classify. Adults correctly use the numerical information in their estimates and provide responses 
that reflect the base-rates; that is, they produced a mean as a group that was statistically equal to 
70% (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Though similar to the base-rate condition in Experiment 1, 
this condition places children in a very different context. In Experiment 1, the robots wore 
different colours in an 8:2 ratio, but this information did not signify any characteristic 
information (i.e., gender or trait) associated with those groups. Unlike the base-rate condition of 
Experiment 1, characteristic group information was associated with each colour of robot 
throughout the narrative. However, at the time of classification, no individuating information 
was given. If children default to base-rates (as adults tend to do in this type of condition), this 
suggests that contexts in which social characteristics are present do not disrupt their base-rate 
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use. If children do not default to base-rates, this suggests that the context alone is enough to 
make children neglect base-rates in their judgements, which would be indicative of an even 
stronger bias than in the irrelevant condition. Thus, children’s responses in the no individuating 
condition will be compared to a predicted value corresponding to the base-rate of 80%. 
 To simplify the structure of the problems, only colours were used to depict base-rates. 
The trait and gender stereotypes from Experiment 1 were used because they provide an 
interesting test case: 4-year-olds appeared to be developing an ability to use these stereotypes in 
classification and 5-year-olds were very competent at making these inferences. To further 
investigate the development of base-rate neglect, 6-year-olds and adults were also tested in 
Experiment 2. In all problems, the normatively correct answer is to produce a response that takes 
base-rates into account.  
Methods 
Participants. 
 One-hundred and ninety-two children were included in the final analyses of Experiment 
2. Forty-eight children participated in the conflict condition, including 16 four-year-olds, 16 five-
year-olds, and 16 six-year-olds (Mage = 5;6 [year;months], range = 4;1-6;11; 21 females). An 
additional five children were tested and were excluded due to parental report of very low English 
language exposure (i.e., hearing English less than 50% of the time, a criterion that was set before 
data collection commenced, n=3) or experimenter error (n=2). Forty-eight children participated 
in the no conflict condition, 16 at each age (Mage = 5;6, range = 4;2-6;11; 20 females). An 
additional two children were tested and were excluded due to non-compliance. Forty-eight 
children participated in the irrelevant condition, 16 at each age (Mage = 5;6, range = 4;0-6;10; 31 
females). An additional two children were tested and were excluded due to non-compliance. 
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Forty-eight children participated in the no individuating condition, 16 at each age (Mage = 5;5, 
range = 4;0-6;11; 26 females). An additional three children were tested and were excluded due to 
non-compliance (n=2) or failing to correctly identify the majority group in both problems (n=1).  
Procedure. 
 Participants completed two problems, presented consecutively. As in Experiment 1, 
children completed a trait and a gender problem, using the same colour, group, and individuating 
information as before. Each child saw one colour pair and the associated group information on 
the first trial, and another colour pair and associated group information on the second trial. The 
instructions were the same as in Experiment 1; however, participants were specifically told that 
they would answer a question about one of the robots at the end. 
 Using the trait problem as an example, children were first introduced to the two types of 
robots and were told about the nice and mean traits that corresponded to each colour (see Figure 
4 for an example of a trait conflict problem). Once again, they heard characteristic group 
information about the robots’ behaviour. Next, participants were presented with the base-rate 
information: a group of ten robots, with eight wearing blue and two wearing green. Children 
were asked to indicate which type of robot there was more of at the park. Following this, 
children saw a single robot from the group wearing a white coat, making its type unclear. To 
ensure both pieces of information were equally salient to the child, the experimenter reminded 
the child of the base-rate and group information in a counterbalanced order. In each problem, 
base-rate and group information were explicitly mentioned twice to the child prior to hearing the 
individuating information about the robot. The experimenter then provided individuating 
information about the robot wearing the white coat. Participants were asked to classify the colour 
of the robot wearing the white coat.  
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This robot is nice most of the time. If it was at a birthday party, 
it would bring flowers for the birthday robot. 
 
This robot is naughty most of the time. If it was at a birthday 
party, it would hide the presents from the birthday robot. 
 
There are ten robots at the park today. Let’s count them 
(count). So, there are eight wearing blue and two wearing 
green. Which one is there more of? 
 
 
Look, it’s one of the robots from the group we just saw! It’s 
wearing a white coat, so we don’t know what colour it is 
wearing. Remember, the ones that wear blue are nice most of 
the time and the ones that wear green are naughty most of the 
time, and there were more robots wearing blue at the park 
today. This robot likes to make a mess of the park and scare 
other robots. What colour is this one wearing, blue or green? 
 
Figure 4. Sample of trait conflict problem in Experiment 2. 
 Children participated in one of four conditions, which determined the type of 
individuating information they received (see Table 2 for individuating information used in each 
condition). In the conflict condition, participants were told individuating information that 
conflicted with the base-rate. In the no conflict condition, participants were told individuating 
information that aligned with the base-rate. In the irrelevant condition, participants were told 
individuating information that was not useful to group classification. In the no individuating 
condition, participants were not given additional information about the robot. All participants 
were asked to classify the colour of the robot wearing the white coat. 
 All factors that were counterbalanced in Experiment 1 were counterbalanced here. The 
order of reminding about base-rate and group information was also counterbalanced. The group 
information associated with the robots in the conflict and no conflict conditions was 
counterbalanced (i.e., the type of robot the individuating information represented). 
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Table 2. Individuating information in Experiment 2. 
Condition Girl Boy Nice Mean 
Conflict and 
No conflict   
This robot 
likes to play 
dress up and 
house. 
This robot likes 
to play with 
trucks and 
trainsets. 
This robot likes to 
clean up the park 
and help its friend 
play on the swing. 
This robot likes 
to make a mess 




Irrelevant This robot likes to have a 
snack before recess and plays 
with its friends. 
This robot likes to play on the slide 
and in the sand. 
 
Adult Participants. 
 To ensure that the stimuli elicited typical use of the representativeness heuristic in adults, 
undergraduate participants were given the same problems presented to children (N=32; range = 
18- to 23-years-old; female = 20). Five additional participants were tested and replaced. One 
participant was replaced for indicating that they were familiar with the representativeness 
heuristic upon a manipulation check. That is, they stated that they were familiar with the 
representativeness heuristic and provided a reasonable description of it when they were explicitly 
asked at the end of the study. Participants were also replaced for changing their answers during 
the session, which they were instructed against doing (n=4). Four between-subjects conditions 
(conflict, no conflict, irrelevant, and no individuating), in which participants completed four 
problems of the same type, were included. For instance, a participant in the conflict condition 
completed four conflict problems. One story was used for the first two problems (e.g., trait), with 
one of the two robot types as the majority for each problem. The second story was used for the 
last two problems (e.g., gender). The experimenter provided the participant with the same group 
and individuating information told to children, except two additional pieces of irrelevant 
individuating information were added for adults. Only two problems were presented to children, 
one gender and one trait problem, so the same irrelevant individuating information was used 
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regardless of the base-rate. Because adults completed two problems of each type (four in total), I 
created an additional piece of irrelevant individuating information for each problem. This 
ensured they did not hear the same information twice. For the second gender irrelevant problem, 
participants were told that the robot liked to have a sandwich at lunch and coloured with its 
friends. For the second trait irrelevant problem, participants were told that the robot liked to play 
on the monkey bars and on the swing. To facilitate comparison with child participants, the stories 
were presented using a PowerPoint presentation that was narrated live by an experimenter. 
Participants selected their choices to the experimenter’s questions on a response sheet. Following 
the session, adults were asked whether they were familiar with the representativeness heuristic. 
Results 
 All videos from in-lab participants were secondary coded (N=27), with a 100% 
agreement rate between the experimenter and secondary coder. Half of the transcription data for 
the community participants was also reliability coded. There was one disagreement, which was 
resolved via discussion. For each problem, responses were coded such that a score of 1 
corresponded to a choice of the majority group and 0 corresponded to a choice of the minority 
group on each problem (i.e., problems were scored according to base-rate use). Because adults 
completed four problems and children completed two problems, I computed the percentage of 
responses in which each participant used the base-rate, after confirming via preliminary analyses 
that there were no effects of problem type (gender or trait) and no effects of counterbalancing.  
Child Participants. 
 384 trials were included in the analyses, as each child completed two problems. A GEE 
binary logistic regression including age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, 6-year-olds) and condition 
(conflict, no conflict, irrelevant, no individuating), as between-subjects factors revealed a 
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significant interaction of age and condition, Wald χ2(df = 6) = 14.1, p = .03, and a main effect of 
condition, Wald χ2(df = 3) = 48.73, p < .001. The main effect of age was not significant, Wald 
χ2(df = 2) = 4.45, p = .11. 
 To explore the relationship between age and condition, I conducted follow-up GEE 
binary logistic regressions for each condition, including age as a between-subjects factor (see 
Figure 5). There was no main effect of age for the irrelevant, no individuating, or no conflict 
conditions. The age by condition interaction was driven by performance in the conflict condition, 
Wald χ2(df = 2) = 13.70, p = .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the performance of 6-year-
olds differed from that of 4-year-olds (MeanDifference = .50, p < .001), and 5-year-olds 
(MeanDifference = .25,  p = .02). 
 Moreover, I conducted binomial tests to explore children’s performance in the irrelevant 
and no individuating conditions. Recall that these analyses are critical to examining the 
pervasiveness of base-rate neglect in children; adults typically do not default to base-rates in 
irrelevant conditions, though they correctly use base-rates in no individuating conditions. I 
compared children’s mean responses at each age to the predicted value of 80%, which reflects 
correct use of the base-rate in both conditions. In the irrelevant condition, children at all ages 
produced responses that were significantly below the predicted value of 80% (4-year-olds: M = 
50%, SD = .5, p < .001; 5-year-olds: M = 56%, SD = .50, p = .002; 6-year-olds: M = 53%, SD = 
.51, p < .001). In the no individuating condition, 4-year-olds’ responses did not differ from the 
predicted value of 80% (M = 78%, SD = .42, p = .47), but 5- and 6-year-olds’ responses 
marginally differed from it (5-year-olds: M = 56%, SD = .50, p = .002; 6-year-olds: M = 56%, 





Figure 5. Mean percent choosing base-rate, averaged across trials for each age by condition in 
Experiment 2. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
Adult Participants.  
 128 trials were included in the analyses because each adult participant completed four 
trials. A GEE linear regression, including condition as a between-subjects factor (conflict, no 
conflict, irrelevant, no individuating) revealed a significant effect of condition, Wald χ2(df = 3) = 
1133.51, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the conflict condition (M=3%, SD=.09) 
differed significantly from the no conflict (M = 100%, SD = 0; MeanDifference= -.97, p < .001), 
irrelevant (M = 66%, SD = .19; MeanDifference = .62 p < .001), and no individuating (M = 88%, 



























































significantly from the no conflict (MeanDifference = -.34, p < .001) and no individuating 
(MeanDifference = -.22, p = .01) conditions. The no conflict and no individuating conditions also 
significantly differed (MeanDifference = -.12, p = .05). 
 I conducted additional binomial tests to compare performance in the irrelevant and no 
individuating conditions to the predicted value of 80%. Adults’ performance in the irrelevant 
condition was significantly different from the base-rate predicted value of 80% (M = 66%, SD = 
.19, p=.04), though performance in the no individuating condition was not significantly different 
from the predicted value (M = 88%, SD =.19, p = .20).  
Discussion 
 Across conditions, I varied the relevance of the individuating information to examine its 
impact on children’s use of base-rate information. Children’s responses on the conflict problems 
revealed an interesting age trend: 4-year-olds gave significantly more base-rate-consistent 
responses, while 6-year-olds relied heavily on individuating information, suggesting greater 
base-rate neglect with age. Responses from 5-year-olds were in between those from the 4- and 6-
year-olds, as they were more likely to neglect base-rates but not as often as the older children. In 
the no conflict condition, all age groups produced responses consistent with both base-rate and 
individuating information at high levels. Children’s responses in the no conflict condition were 
more extreme than those in either of the conditions in Experiment 1. Thus, children may 
integrate base-rate and individuating information, as their responses appear to consider both 
pieces of information additively. 
 The conditions that manipulated relevance were particularly enlightening. At every age 
(including adulthood) participants did not default to base-rates with irrelevant individuating 
information, suggesting that the bias to rely on such information even when it is unwarranted is 
 43 
strong as soon as children begin to use the heuristic. That is, the presence of even irrelevant 
individuating information draws participants away from base-rate use. This suggests that the 
presentation of individuating information may impel participants to incorporate this information 
into their decision. This could be largely due to the role of pragmatics in these problems 
(Schwarz et al., 1991) or to a particularly strong tendency toward base-rate neglect that would 
also be present in real-world judgments. Future work examining the relationship between 
children’s pragmatic reasoning abilities and base-rate neglect on this task could illuminate these 
roles.  
 In the no individuating condition, 4-year-old children and adults used base-rate 
information to predict group membership, providing group level responses in line with the base-
rate predicted value of 80%. However, 5- and 6-year-old children did not use base-rates to the 
same extent, as they produced judgments that were marginally below the predicted value. These 
two conditions, tested with children for the first time, provide additional insight into the 
development of base-rate neglect. Four-year-olds (like adults) correctly used base-rates when 
given no additional information, but the presence of irrelevant individuating information pulled 
their responses away from base-rates (also like adults). It is surprising that older children in the 
sample did not produce responses consistent with base-rates in the no individuating condition. It 
is possible that merely presenting 5- and 6-year-old children with group information in the 
narrative led to base-rate neglect, as they may be particularly sensitive to group characteristics, 
or pragmatics, in their predictive inferences at these ages.  
General Discussion 
 In two experiments, I explored children’s use of base-rate and individuating information. 
The results provide a more complete picture of the development of heuristics and reasoning 
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biases in children. Experiment 1 established the ages at which children can use base-rate and 
individuating information on their own to make inferences. This provided a foundation from 
which to interpret children’s responses when given both types of information together in 
Experiment 2. 
 The current experiments make two broad novel contributions to our understanding of the 
use of the representativeness heuristic in young children. First, these experiments examine the 
representativeness heuristic and its prerequisite abilities in the youngest children tested to date, 
3- and 4-year-olds. This revealed that, while 3-year-olds are capable of making inferences using 
only base-rate information, they do not consistently make inferences based on stereotype or trait 
information alone in this task. Thus, the current data suggest that further examinations of the 
representativeness heuristic might best begin with 4-year-old participants, or a more simplified 
design may be necessary with younger children. The experiments also revealed interesting 
insights into 4-year-olds’ reasoning abilities; they could use both base-rate and individuating 
information alone, and they made stronger inferences when this information cued the same 
response (i.e., in the Experiment 2 no conflict condition). When given conflicting individuating 
information, 4-year-olds produced responses that were closer to the base-rates than those of older 
children and adults. This suggests that they potentially integrate this information in a way that 
produces more rational responses than do older decision-makers. This is consistent with other 
recent findings, which suggest that younger children may benefit from their lack of experience, 
allowing them to engage in less biased reasoning that is more sensitive to objective data, such as 
base-rates and other statistical information (Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2014).  
 Second, manipulating the relevance of the individuating information, along with 
including children of three ages, gives novel insight into the pervasiveness of representativeness 
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use and base-rate neglect in early childhood. When presented with irrelevant individuating 
information, 4-year-olds’ responses were closer to base-rates than were older children’s 
responses. Though this may suggest that younger children are less likely to neglect base-rates 
than are older children, even 4-year-olds did not recognize that irrelevant individuating 
information should be entirely ignored. Thus, by the age of four, children are headed toward 
weighing individuating information too heavily. Interestingly, unlike 5- and 6-year-olds, they did 
default to base-rates when no individuating information was provided, showing that the mere 
presence of trait or stereotype information in the narrative does not impede their base-rate use. 
Furthermore, 5-year-olds’ responses in the conflict condition were not as extreme as 6-year-olds’ 
responses. This suggests that 5-year-olds may weigh base-rates in their predictive inferences, 
even though they still show a bias, but 6-year-olds may almost entirely ignore them.  
In fact, 6-year-olds’ inferences were nearly identical to adults’. The one notable difference 
between these groups was their performance in the no individuating information condition, 
where adults, but not 5- or 6-year-olds, appropriately defaulted to base-rates. This performance 
in the no individuating condition was striking; children of all ages were skilled at using base-rate 
information alone in Experiment 1 when the task was presented in a context entirely devoid of 
social group information. One possibility is that for 5- and 6-year-olds, the mere presence of 
characteristic group information could trigger base-rate neglect in favor of attempts to rely on 
social information. Thus, it is possible that as heuristic use is becoming engrained in early 
development, children are particularly sensitive to conditions that typically signify its use. With 
additional practice in making predictions, decision-makers could start to apply heuristics in more 
appropriate contexts, though notably, even adults are pulled away from base-rates when 
presented with irrelevant individuating information.  
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 In light of these age trends, the development of the representativeness heuristic is more 
nuanced than previously thought. Predictions based on previous work would have suggested that 
as soon as a child is familiar with a stereotype, they will immediately favor it nearly exclusively 
and neglect base-rates (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011), but the current results suggest that this 
bias strengthens between 4 and 6 years of age, as children gain experience making social 
inferences based on characteristic information.  
Limitations 
 One potential limitation of the current design was using the robots’ shirt colours to depict 
the different groups. An alternative way of visually depicting the groups is to use a more fixed 
physical characteristic such as a biological marking, implying a more intrinsic and enduring 
difference across groups.  Although depicting group differences visually through shirt colours 
may seem arbitrary, this design feature has some benefits over depicting the groups using a more 
fixed physical characteristic. Importantly, a fixed feature could imply to children that the traits 
and stereotypes associated with the feature are completely inflexible. Depicting traits and 
stereotypes in this manner could cause participants to think that these characteristics apply 
deterministically and this might subsequently cause them to think that the individuating 
information is perfectly diagnostic, making the base-rate information entirely irrelevant. Future 
studies could use designs that imply higher or lower levels of fixed correspondence between the 
group markings and the characteristics to assess whether these design choices impact children’s 
use of base-rates and individuating information.   
 A second limitation of the current studies is the forced-choice method of responding. To 
ensure children of all ages could provide a response, I used a binary dependent variable. This 
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differs from the more graded judgments provided by adults, which can provide insight on their 
ability to integrate social and numerical information. I return to this important point in Chapter 3.   
Implications and Conclusions 
 In sum, quite soon after children reliably use base-rate and individuating information 
separately in their inferences, they favor individuating information when both pieces of 
information are presented together. Thus, when children have the available knowledge and 
cognitive skills required for the task, their decision-making is often governed by the more 
efficient process. As many previous studies have used individuating information without first 
examining the use of the individuating information at the relevant ages on its own, these results 
are the first to suggest that the representativeness heuristic is readily used by 5-year-olds and at 
similar levels to adults by age 6.  
 This chapter explored the development of the representativeness heuristic in young 
children. For the first time in a developmental investigation, 4- to 6-year-old children were 
presented with pivotal manipulations that establish the extent of their bias. These conditions 
illuminated interesting age differences between the youngest and oldest children in the sample. 
In light of these age differences, I explore how varying the strength of the base-rate and 
individuating information affects children’s inferences across ages in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3: Examining Developmental Change in Young Children’s 
Information Integration 
The findings in Chapter 2 are the first to examine the pervasiveness of the 
representativeness heuristic in 4- to 6-year-old children. Within a period of two years, children’s 
sensitivity toward base-rate information is overtaken by a preference for case-specific 
individuating information. That is, by the age of 6, young children show a bias for individuating 
information at similar rates as adults, though 4-year-olds tend to use base-rate information in 
their inferences. This is quite striking; 4-year-olds relied on individuating information when it 
was the only available information in the problem, though they did not show a bias toward this 
information when it conflicted with base-rates. These findings are in contrast to previous work 
suggesting that children show a preference for individuating information as soon as they possess 
the requisite trait and stereotype information (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011). Due to the small 
body of work on the representativeness heuristic in young children, it is unclear what 
mechanisms contribute to the emergence and strengthening of a bias to neglect base-rates 
between the ages of 4 and 6.  
It is possible that the emergence of the representativeness heuristic is due in part to a 
general feature of children’s cognition: the development of children’s intuitive theories about the 
role of personal characteristics in predicting others’ thoughts, preferences, and behaviours. Like 
adults, children may have a strong prior belief about the importance of personal characteristics in 
predicting others’ actions. However, this theory may not be fully developed until the age of 6. 
This is consistent with findings on the development of the fundamental attribution error in 4- and 
6-year-old American children (Seiver, Gopnik, & Goodman, 2013). In Western cultures, adults 
often favor person-specific causes of behaviour over explanations that consider situational 
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factors, which is known as the fundamental attribution error. Seiver et al. (2013) explored if 
children would correctly use covariation evidence to explain and predict a character’s behaviour 
or if they would be biased toward more person-specific reasoning. While 4-year-olds relied on 
the covariation data in their predictions and did not show a strong a bias toward person-specific 
explanations, 6-year-old children showed a preference for person-specific explanations of 
behaviour over situational explanations, similar to adults in Western societies. Thus, as they gain 
experience navigating complex social environments situated within a Western society, it is 
possible that children are developing overarching beliefs about what types of information are 
useful for predicting others’ actions, biasing them toward personal characteristics in general, as 
this is an efficient shortcut. As their intuitive theory strengthens, children weigh personal 
characteristics more highly and thus downgrade the importance of other information, such as 
base-rates or covariation data. This might give rise to the somewhat counter-intuitive data pattern 
revealed in Chapter 2, where younger children produced responses that were more in line with 
mathematically normative judgments, in which the base-rates influenced their responses. That is, 
younger children, whom are less entrenched in using traits and stereotypes to make inferences 
about behaviour, provide less biased and more rational judgments that are more aligned with the 
observed data. In the previous chapter, 6-year-olds showed a bias toward individuating 
information. Moreover, the inclusion of group information affected their inferences even when 
the problem did not contain individuating information, suggesting that the mere presence of a 
social scenario caused them to neglect base-rates. Conversely, 4-year-old children, who may not 
hold a strong prior belief regarding how individual characteristics should be used to make 
inferences about people, trended more toward the base-rate information in their responses. Thus, 
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children use the more reliable base-rate information in their inferences while they are gaining 
strength in their theory about the role of personal characteristics in predicting behaviours.  
Alternatively, the age differences between 4- and 6-year-old children may be due to 6-
year-olds’ increased experience in using particular stereotypes and traits in their inferences. 
Between 4 and 6 years of age, children gain more experience using information about traits to 
predict behaviours and require less information to make trait-based inferences. For instance, after 
observing a character take toys that belonged to other children, 3- and 4-year-olds predicted that 
the character would continue to take toys after observing four instances of taking, although 5- 
and 6-year-old children made this inference after observing one instance of taking (Boseovski & 
Lee, 2006; Boseovski et al., 2013). Moreover, children acquire more information about gender 
stereotypes as they attend to gender information in their social environments and are exposed to 
cultural ideals (Arthur et al., 2008; Bigler & Liben, 2007; Martin & Ruble, 2004; Shutts, 2013; 
Trautner et al., 2005). This is not to say that 4-year-olds’ use of base-rates was due to a lack of 
familiarity with the specific trait information and gender stereotypes tested in Chapter 2; recall 
that 4-year-olds relied on the individuating information in their inferences when it was the only 
available information in Experiment 1. Rather, more experience and knowledge with these 
specific traits and cultural stereotypes may have led 6-year-olds to rely on the individuating 
information due to the ease with which they have come to use this information.  
In Experiments 3 and 4, I presented 4- and 6-year-old children with another child-friendly 
version of the lawyer-engineer problem. This problem was similar to the problem presented to 
children in Chapter 2, however, it was modified to achieve two main theoretical goals and one 
methodological goal. First, I created two new problems that contained group information that 
signified a preference for an activity. This allowed for a conceptual replication of the key 
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findings in Chapter 2. In lieu of the previous trait and stereotype information, which children 
likely conceptualize as dichotomous, I chose preferences that are not dichotomous. In the activity 
problem, participants were told a story about children in a class that could play baseball or make 
crafts during free time. In a second problem, participants were told a story about children in a 
class that could learn about space or wild animals during a trip to a museum. The preferences 
used in these problems are not as dichotomous as the trait and gender information used in 
Chapter 2; nice and mean are often viewed as opposite traits, and gender roles and stereotypes 
are categorized in a dichotomous fashion in Western cultures. The current problems, however, 
contained preferences that were not mutually exclusive. Though some individuals prefer sports 
over arts, or learning about a particular topic, it is not uncommon to partake in both activities 
even if one has a preference. Including problems that contain less stringent features allowed for a 
broader view on children’s conceptual development.  
Second, I aimed to further examine the age differences in children’s information 
integration abilities. I manipulated the strength of the base-rate and individuating information to 
examine if its use was moderated by the quality and strength of the information it provided. 
Along with the manipulations of relevance in the previous experiments, presenting children with 
individuating information that is equally relevant, though varied in strength, provides further 
insight into the mechanisms underlying children’s base-rate neglect. It is unclear from the 
previous experiments if 6-year-olds are attending to the quality of the individuating information, 
or if they are categorizing the individual based on the content of the individuating information 
without evaluating the quality of the information. Likewise, I also manipulated the base-rate 
information to examine children’s ability to weigh this information in their judgements. From the 
previous experiments, it is unclear if 6-year-olds would ever factor base-rate information into 
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their judgements, because they did not default to base-rates when no individuating information 
was available. This manipulation will also provide additional insight on the performance of 4-
year-old children, who tend to closely represent the observed data in their inferences (Gualtieri & 
Denison, 2018; Seiver et al., 2013). Manipulating the strength (i.e., the skew) of the base-rate in 
this problem will allow me to examine if children at both ages are neglecting this information all 
together, or if they are attempting to reconcile the information provided by the base-rate and 
individuating information.  
A final goal of the current experiment was methodological and exploratory in nature. In 
adult versions of the task, participants are asked to indicate the likelihood that the individual 
belongs to an occupation (e.g., they are asked to provide an estimate using a percent value that 
Jack is an engineer). In developing a child-friendly version of this task, I employed a forced-
choice procedure suitable for children in this age group, which is consistent with all previous 
approaches (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011; Gualtieri & Denison, 2018). Young children cannot 
provide estimates using percentage values and seldom provide relevant explanations for their 
behaviour and thought processes. However, using a binary dependent measure is limiting, and 
may be masking nuances in children’s weighing of base-rates and individuating information. To 
combat this problem, researchers have created inference scores from children’s binary responses 
and their estimates of confidence in their response and have found that this can provide a more 
complete picture of performance (Kalish, Kim, & Young, 2012). In Experiments 3 and 4, I 
continued to ask children to choose between two options when identifying an unknown 
individual, though, after children made their choice, I also asked them to estimate their 
confidence in their response using a 3-point scale. Creating inference scores from the product of 
these measures might provide insight the strength of children’s beliefs about their choice.  
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Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 tested 4- and 6-year-old children’s use of individuating information when it 
conflicted with base-rate information. To explore the effects of individuating information quality 
on children’s performance, children participated in one of two between-subjects conditions that 
varied the strength of individuating information provided.   
Methods 
Participants.  
 Children were tested individually at their schools or at a local museum. Sixty-four 
children were included in the final analyses, with 16 four- and 16 six-year-olds in each of the two 
conditions (see Table 3 for age and gender breakdown). An additional five children were tested 
and excluded for not finishing the task (n = 3), failing both comprehension checks (n = 1; see 
Procedure for details) and parental report of atypical development (n = 1).  
Table 3. Age and gender breakdown per condition in Experiment 3. 
 Mean age Min age Max age Female 
     More individuating      
4-year-olds 54.89 months 51.69 months 58.76 months 6 
6-year-olds 77.19 months 72.33 months 83.33 months 11 
     Less individuating     
4-year-olds 53.69 months 48.62 months 59.62 months 10 
6-year-olds 78.86 months 74.07 months 83.76 months 11 
Note: n = 16 per age, in each condition.  
Materials and Procedure. 
 Participants heard two stories about children in a class at a school, narrated live by the 
experimenter using a PowerPoint presentation (see Figure 6 for an overview). In the activity 
story, participants were told that children in a class could make a craft or play baseball during 
free time. Participants were shown a base-rate of children who completed each activity that the 
experimenter counted aloud. The base-rate for each problem consisted of eight children 
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completing one activity and two completing the other activity (e.g., eight children making a craft 
and two children playing baseball). After counting, participants were asked which activity was 
completed by more children. Depending on the participant’s response, the experimenter agreed 
or disagreed with the child’s answer and stated that there were more children who made a craft 
and less who played baseball. Following this, participants were told that one child in the class 
went home for lunch, and they were given case-specific individuating information about the 
child’s traits and preferences that were more stereotypical of a child who, for example, is more 
likely to enjoy sports versus arts and crafts. The base-rate information always conflicted with this 
description, because the individuating information was representative of the minority group. 
More specifically, if a participant was shown a base-rate of eight children making a craft and two 
playing baseball, they were given information that corresponded to an interest in sports.  
Introduction 
 
Participants were told that children in a class 
could make a craft or play baseball. 
Base-rate 
 
Participants saw a base-rate of 10 children, 8 
of which completed one activity, and 2 






Participants were told that one of the kids went 
home for lunch after free time, and they were 
given additional individuating information about 
the child. Participants were then asked what 
activity this child completed during free time. 
 
Figure 6. Overview of the procedure in Experiments 3 and 4. 
 I varied the amount of individuating information given to participants across two 
conditions. Children in the more individuating condition were given a lengthier description that 
was typical of the descriptions used in the classic studies with adults and the investigation in 
Chapter 2. Children in the less individuating condition were given a brief description of the 
child’s preferences, which was still representative of one of the groups (see Table 4 for 
Unknown
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individuating information for each condition). After they were told the individuating 
information, the experimenter asked the participant to indicate which activity they thought the 
child completed earlier in the day. Once the child made their choice, the experimenter asked 
them to rate their confidence in their response (i.e., “Is it for sure that one, maybe that one, or are 
you guessing?”) In the museum story, participants were told a story about a class on a field trip 
where the children chose between a wild animal exhibit and a space exhibit. Similar to the 
activity story, I used an 8:2 base-rate and participants were given individuating information that 
corresponded with preferences that seemed more in line with the minority group. The order of 
the stories presented (i.e., activity story first, museum story first), the majority group (and, thus, 
the individuating information used), the placement of the base-rate objects, and the group 
introduced first were counterbalanced across participants.   
Table 4. Individuating information provided to children in Experiments 3 and 4. 
 Activity story Museum story 
Condition Craft Baseball Wild animal Space 
More 
individuating 
This kid likes to 
paint and play with 
play-doh. They like 
to make cool things 
and use their 
imagination. 
This kid likes to 
play soccer and 
tag. They like to 
run around at 
recess and ride 
their bike to 
school. 
This kid wanted a 
cat on their cake. 
They want to take 
care of animals 
when they grow 
up, and they read 
books about 
sharks.   
This kid wanted a 
rocket on their 
cake. They want to 
be an astronaut 
when they grow 
up, and they read 
books about aliens. 
Less 
individuating 
This kid likes to 
paint and play with 
play-doh. 
This kid likes to 
play soccer and 
tag. 
This kid wanted a 
cat on their cake. 
This kid wanted a 




 Children received a score of 1 if they selected the group that corresponded to the 
individuating information. Though selecting the majority group indicated by the base-rate would 
be a closer approximation to a normative response, I coded the data in this way because I 
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manipulated the strength of the individuating information (which also facilitates comparison to 
the results of Experiment 4, when the base-rate is 50/50). 128 trials were included in the final 
analyses, because each child completed two trials (see Figure 7 for overall means). Preliminary 
analyses indicated there were no effects of counterbalancing or story type (i.e., problem order: 
first, second; story: activity, museum) on children’s responses. A Generalized Estimating 
Equation (GEE) binary logistic regression with age (4-year-olds, 6-year-olds), condition (more 
individuating, less individuating) and the interaction between age and condition revealed a 
significant main effect of condition, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 9.99, p = .002, and age, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 
5.18, p = .02. A significant age by condition interaction was also observed, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 
5.18, p = .02. 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of children’s responses that used individuating information in Experiment 
3 (lower scores indicate use of base-rate information). 
 
 Pairwise comparisons provided additional insight on the age by condition interaction. 
There was a significant difference between 6-year-olds in the more condition (M = .69, SD = 
0.47) and 4-year-olds in the more condition (M = .25, SD = .44; MeanDifference = -.44, p < .001) 

































was also a significant difference between the performance of 6-year-olds in the more condition 
and those in the less condition (M = .19, SD = .40; MeanDifference = -.50, p < .001).   
 I created inference scores from children’s responses and confidence scores. Children who 
used the individuating information and were confident received a score of 6, whereas those who 
used the base-rate and were confident received a score of 1. This created a 6-point scale. A GEE 
linear regression with age (4-year-olds, 6-year-olds), condition (more individuating, less 
individuating), and their interaction revealed significant main effects of child’s age, Wald χ2(df = 
1) = 4.60, p = .03, and condition, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 16.36, p < .001. The interaction between age 
and condition was also significant, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 8.84, p = .003. These findings replicate 
those found with the forced-choice dependent measure, validating that these trends hold when a 
more sensitive dependent variable is employed (see Figure 8 for overall scores).  
 
Figure 8. Inference scores for Experiment 3. 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 3, I presented 4- and 6-year-old children with an adapted version of the 
lawyer-engineer problem in which base-rate and individuating information conflicted. When 


























the individuating information in their inferences while 4-year-olds opted to use the base-rate 
information. This replicated the findings in the conflict condition of Experiment 2, in which 4-
year-olds’ inferences trended toward base-rate use, while 6-year-olds over-relied on 
individuating information. That is, 6-year-olds continued to neglect base-rates in these problems, 
which contained personal preference information that is less practice and culturally engrained 
than the trait and gender stereotypes used in Chapter 2. Thus, it seems that their use of 
individuating information may be due in part to a stronger prior regarding the importance of 
personal characteristics in behavioural predictions. However, 6-year-olds did not arbitrarily rely 
on the individuating information, weighing its quality with the information provided by the base-
rate. When presented with the less descriptive individuating information, 4- and 6-year-olds used 
the base-rate information in their decision. Thus, although 6-year-olds show a general tendency 
to rely on individuating information when it conflicts with base-rates, they seem to monitor the 
quality of the information provided and opt to rely more on base-rates when the individuating 
information is less informative.  
 The general trends observed with the binary choice dependent measure were replicated 
using the more sensitive inference scores (i.e., the product of a child’s binary choice and their 
confidence in their response). This suggests that the forced-choice procedure is not masking 
children’s responses, and affirms that the procedure used in Chapter 2 provided a valid 
assessment of children’s estimates.   
 The results from Experiment 3 suggest that by age 6, although children are generally 
biased toward individuating information, they evaluate the quality of the individuating 
information in their inferences and weigh this information with the base-rate. Conversely, 4-
year-olds seem to align their responses with the base-rate, regardless of the informativeness of 
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the individuating information. From these findings, it is unclear if 6-year-olds are truly attending 
to the base-rate information or if their responses are simply based on the quality of the 
individuating information. That is, it is possible that 6-year-olds may be selecting the opposite of 
the individuating information because they find it uninformative. It is also unclear if 4-year-olds 
are able to use the individuating information in their responses at all. With no baseline data for 
Experiment 3, I cannot say whether 4-year-olds are prioritizing the base-rates or are instead 
completely unable to use this new group information in their inferences. In Experiment 4, I 
present children with an equal base-rate to examine their use of individuating information when 
the base-rate is uninformative. If children are attending to the base-rate and individuating 
information, they should rely on the individuating information in their inferences, though their 
use of this information should reflect the quality of the description it provides.  
Experiment 4 
 Experiment 4 tested children’s use of individuating information with an equal base-rate 
(i.e., 5:5). As in Experiment 3, children participated in one of two between-subjects conditions 
that varied the amount of individuating information provided.   
Methods 
Participants.  
 Children were tested individually at their schools or at a local museum. Sixty-four 
children were included in the final analyses, with 16 four- and 16 six-year-olds in each of the two 
conditions (see Table 5 for age and gender breakdown). An additional five children were tested 
and excluded for not finishing the task (n = 2), or failing both comprehension checks (n = 3; see 
Procedure for details). 
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Table 5. Age and gender breakdown per condition in Experiment 4. 
 Mean age Min age Max age Female 
     More individuating      
4-year-olds 55.87 months 48.91 months 59.13 months 6 
6-year-olds 76.67 months 72.16 months 83.42 months 5 
     Less individuating     
4-year-olds 55.79 months 49.29 months 59.62 months 7 
6-year-olds 77.09 months 73.88 months 83.91 months 9 
Note: n = 16 per age, in each condition.  
Materials and Procedure. 
 The procedure was identical to Experiment 3, with the exception of the base-rate 
information. In this experiment, children were presented with a 5:5 base-rate in both problems. 
Thus, the base-rate information should indicate a 50/50 chance that the child completed either 
activity. As in Experiment 3, the individuating information was varied between conditions, with 
half of the participants completing the more individuating condition, and half completing the less 
individuating condition. The order of the stories presented (i.e., activity story first, museum story 
first), the individuating information used, the placement of the base-rate objects, and the group 
introduced first were counterbalanced across participants.  
Results 
 Children received a score of 1 if they selected the group that corresponded to the 
individuating information. 128 trials were included in the final analyses, because each child 
completed two trials (see Figure 9 for overall means). Preliminary analyses indicated there were 
no effects of counterbalancing (i.e., problem order: first, second; story: activity, museum) on 
children’s responses. A GEE binary logistic regression with age (4-year-olds, 6-year-olds), 
condition (more individuating, less individuating), and their interaction revealed a significant 
main effect of and age, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 4.92, p = .03. Condition, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 1.50, p = 
.22, and the age by condition interaction, Wald χ2(df = 1) = .41, p = .52, did not have a significant 
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effect on children’s scores. Six-year-olds (more individuating M = .88, SD = .34; less 
individuating M = .75, SD = .44) tended to rely more on the individuating information than 4-
year-olds (more individuating M = .66, SD = .48; less individuating M = .59, SD = .50).  
 
Figure 9. Proportion of children’s responses that used individuating information in Experiment 
4 (performance around 50% indicates use of base-rate information). 
 I created inference scores from children’s responses and confidence scores. That is, 
children who used the individuating information and were confident received a score of 6, 
though those who did not and were confident received a score of 1. This created a 6-point scale. 
A GEE linear regression with age (4-year-olds, 6-year-olds), condition (more individuating, less 
individuating), and their interaction revealed a significant main effect of child’s age, Wald χ2(df 
= 1) = 7.17, p = .007. Condition, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 2.66, p = .10, and the age by condition 
interaction, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 1.54, p = .26, did not have a significant effect on children’s scores 


































Figure 10. Inference scores for Experiment 4. 
 From these findings, it is unclear if 4-year-olds are favouring the base-rate information or 
simply did not find the individuating information representative of a child who might like the 
activity. When 4-year-olds’ performance was collapsed across both conditions (as there was no 
effect of condition), it was marginally different from chance, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 2.94, p = .087.  
Although this suggests that they could, to some extent, use the individuating information in their 
decisions but were more pulled toward the base-rate, I presented a group of 4-year-old children 
(N = 32, Mage = 55.48 months) with the individuating information used in the less individuating 
condition. This was to ensure that they were able to provide a response based on individuating 
information in that condition, as children’s performance was quite close to chance in this 
condition (59%). Similar to the baseline condition in Chapter 2, children were given the group 
information (i.e., some kids like to play baseball, and others like to make crafts) and were given 
individuating information about a child that corresponded to the descriptions used in less 
individuating conditions of Experiments 3 and 4. After they were given this information, 
participants were asked which activity the child preferred. Thus, children were not given any 


























individuating information in their responses at above chance levels (M = .73, SD = .45), Wald 
χ2(df = 1) = 13.47, p < .001, suggesting that they found the description representative of each 
group and could use this information in their inferences. 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 4, I presented children with an equal base-rate and varied the quality of the 
individuating information. In this context, 6-year-olds used the individuating information in their 
responses. They also showed signs of sensitivity to the quality of the information, relying more 
on the individuating information when it provided them with a stronger description (88% vs. 
75% of the time, though this difference was not statistically significant). Four-year-olds were 
less sensitive to this information and did not rely on the individuating information in their 
responses. In fact, they seemed pulled to the base-rate information, with their mean use of the 
individuating information close to chance performance. To rule out the possibility that 4-year-
olds did not find the individuating information indicative of either activity, I established that they 
were able to use this information in their inferences when no base-rate information was 
available. From these findings, it seems that 4-year-olds are biased toward the base-rate 
information, though 6-year-olds weigh the quality of the information in their inferences.  
 The general trends observed with the binary choice dependent measure were once again 
replicated using the more sensitive inference scores, suggesting that the forced-choice procedure 
is not masking children’s responses.   
General Discussion 
 In Experiments 3 and 4, I presented 4- and 6-year-old children with base-rate and 
individuating information in a child-friendly version of the lawyer-engineer problem. To follow-
up the experiments presented in Chapter 2, I manipulated the strength of the base-rate and 
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individuating information provided. Across manipulations, 4-year-olds seemed biased to attend 
to the base-rate information. Although they were able to use the individuating information when 
presented on its own, 4-year-olds continued to neglect the individuating information even when 
it would have been reasonable to rely on it in their judgements. Conversely, 6-year-olds opted to 
rely on the individuating information when they were given a strong description that conflicted 
with the base-rates. However, when the individuating information was not as strong, 6-year-olds 
used the base-rates in their judgments. From these findings, it seems that 6-year-olds are 
generally biased toward the individuating information in their judgments, though they attend to 
the quality of the information when deciding whether to rely on it over the base-rate.  
 Between the ages of 4 and 6, children’s approach to reconciling base-rate and 
individuating information undergoes drastic developmental change. Four-year-olds opted to use 
base-rate information in their judgements, even when this information was not particularly 
informative to their final decision in the equal base-rate condition. These findings are in line with 
previous work that has found that 4-year-olds tend to stick with the observed data, suggesting 
that they prefer a more data-driven approach than older children and adults (Gualtieri & Denison, 
2018; Lucas et al., 2014; Seiver et al., 2013). Children use statistical data to learn complex 
relationships in their environments, and thus may consider base-rate data more informative than 
socio-cultural information. Given that even infants use base-rates and statistical information in 
their reasoning (Denison et al., 2013; Saffran & Kirkham, 2018), it is possible that 4-year-olds 
are more practiced in using statistical data. I return to this important point in Chapter 4.   
 Within a period of two years, children develop a preference for individuating 
information, as evidenced by 6-year-olds’ reliance on a strong piece of individuating information 
that conflicted with a base-rate. Thus, this suggests that 6-year-olds have a more general 
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preference for individuating information, which is not specific to the familiar traits and 
stereotypes that were used in Chapter 2. Rather, 6-year-olds seem to have a strong prior belief 
regarding the importance of personality descriptions in predicting behaviour, which is also 
evident in their preference for this information over statistical data in prior work (Gualtieri & 
Denison, 2018; Seiver et al., 2013). Moreover, 6-year-olds’ preference for individuating 
information was moderated by the quality of the information. Whereas they relied on the strong 
individuating information when it conflicted with the base-rate, they used the base-rates in their 
inferences when it conflicted with a weaker piece of individuating information that contained 
representative information. Though this suggests that 6-year-olds may be integrating 
information, because their use of individuating information is moderated by its quality, it is 
somewhat puzzling that they were sensitive to this information here but were not discriminate in 
their use of individuating information in Chapter 2. Recall that when given irrelevant and no 
individuating information in Chapter 2, 6-year-olds did not default to base-rates. Though, when 
given lower quality, yet relevant, individuating information in Chapter 3, 6-year-olds used the 
base-rate in their inferences. Why might we see a difference across these manipulations? One 
possibility is that children in the irrelevant condition of Experiment 2, much like adults, believed 
that the description was relevant to their decision and attempted to reconcile this information 
with the base-rate, which led them to not fully default to base-rates in their judgments. However, 
it is unclear why 6-year-olds did not default to base-rates when given no individuating 
information, though relied on base-rates when weaker individuating information was available. It 
is possible that the no individuating problem in Chapter 2 contained garden-path features, 
misleading 6-year-olds due to the structure of the problem and lack of individuating information. 
Including lower quality individuating information in the less individuating conditions may have 
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facilitated a comparison of the base-rate and individuating information, as both were present, 
whereas this was not highlighted when the problem lacked individuating information. Because 
these findings are still open to interpretation, it would be beneficial to systematically study the 
conditions in which 6-year-olds neglect base-rates. Determining which factors affect their base-
rate use would aid in the design of interventions that target potential biases.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
 In Experiments 3 and 4, I presented children with social group information that is less 
practiced in Western societies. This allowed me to examine the extent of children’s preference 
for individuating information in general, apart from their prior experience with the specific 
information. Together, the findings in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that 6-year-olds’ preference for 
individuating information is not specific to traits and stereotypes that they are highly practiced 
in, but a general feature of their cognition. However, it would be beneficial to systematically 
examine the effect of prior experience on children’s use of individuating information with 
relevant and irrelevant individuating information that vary in strength. Previous findings have 
established that familiarity with relevant social stereotypes is pivotal to children’s use of 
individuating information (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011). Because these studies did not 
manipulate the relevance and quality of the individuating information, systematically 
manipulating children’s familiarity with social group information along with features of the 
individuating information would shed light on nuances in their base-rate neglect.  
  A methodological goal of the current experiments involved examining the validity of 
inference scores as a dependent measure. These scores were created using the product of 
children’s response to the forced-choice question and their confidence in their response. The 
findings from the inference scores confirmed the general trends captured by the binary dependent 
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measure, which aided in establishing the validity of the forced-choice scores. However, it is 
unclear if, and to what extent, this measure illuminated any nuances in children’s ability to 
integrate information. Although the inference scores replicated the general findings of the binary 
dependent measure, they provided no further insight on children’s decision-making. In Chapter 
5, I revisit the issue of using a binary dependent measure and discuss alternative solutions for 
creating a continuous dependent measure suitable for this age group.  
Implications and Conclusions  
 In Chapter 3, I presented findings that suggest 4- and 6-year-old children employ 
different strategies when reconciling base-rate and individuating information. Four-year-olds 
tend to align their responses with the base-rate data, even in situations where it would be 
reasonable to rely on individuating information. Conversely, 6-year-olds show a preference for 
strong individuating information, although weigh the quality of the individuating information 
and rely on base-rates when the individuating information is less descriptive. Together with the 
findings in Chapter 2, these four experiments provide pivotal insight on the development of the 
representativeness heuristic, illuminating nuances in the emergence and strengthening of 
children’s biases that were previously unexplored.  
 From these findings, one may conclude that 4-year-old children rely heavily on base-rate 
information when making a decision, leading to what looks like mathematically normative 
responding from a relatively young group of children. However, it is plausible that 4-year-old 
children’s preference for base-rate information may also be due in part to the social information 
at hand, just as it is for 6-year-olds. Although 4-year-olds prefer base-rates over individuating 
information, it is important to establish the parameters of this preference and examine their use 
of base-rates when they conflict with socio-cultural information that may be more salient in their 
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early learning environments. Thus, in Chapter 4, I examine 4- and 5-year-olds’ use of base-rates 
when they conflict with testimony information.  
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Chapter 4: The Development of a Testimony Bias in Young Children 
 In our daily lives, we are frequently in situations where multiple pieces of information 
should factor into our judgments and decisions. However, we sometimes forgo more 
comprehensive computations that involve integrating information and instead make decisions 
using simpler strategies that trade off accuracy for speed and computational efficiency. In a 
classic test of this phenomenon, adults were tasked with identifying the colour of a cab involved 
in a traffic accident (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). They were told that 85% of 
all cabs in the city were green and the other 15% were blue. A witness identified the cab as blue, 
and it was noted that they were accurate 80% of the time when identifying colours under viewing 
conditions similar to those during the accident. In their subsequent estimates, most participants 
reported that there was an 80% chance that the cab was blue. However, this estimation grossly 
neglects the base-rate of cabs in the city. According to Bayes’ theorem, if base-rate and 
testimony information are properly considered, there is only a 41% chance of the cab being 
blue2. That is, there is a 41% chance that the cab is blue once you consider the relatively low 
base-rate of blue cabs, and the chance that the witness accidentally misidentified one of the more 
common green cabs as blue. Instead of integrating base-rate and testimony information, people 
complete a much easier computation and use the witness’ accuracy as a shortcut for the full 
computation. 
 In Experiments 5 and 6, I examined the origins of the adult tendency to rely on testimony 
and neglect base-rates. I presented 4- and 5-year-olds with a child-friendly version of the taxi-
                                               
2 Bayes Theorem:  Pr(𝐵|𝑡 = 	𝐵) = *+,𝑡 = 𝐵-𝐵.*+(/)
*+,t = B-B.*+(/)2*+,𝑡 = 𝑏-𝐺.*+	(5), where t is the witness’ testimony, and B and G indicate 
blue and green respectively. We can compute Pr(𝐵|𝑡 = 	𝐵), the probability that it is really a blue car, given that the witness said it 
was blue, by substituting in the accuracy and base-rate information given in the classic problem: Pr(𝐵|𝑡 = 	𝐵) = (.7)(.89)(.7)(.89)2(.:)(.79) ≈
0.41 
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cab problem, in which they must decide whether or not to agree with a witness when her 
testimony conflicts with base-rate information. Researchers have begun to examine when 
heuristic reasoning, coupled with base-rate neglect, emerges in development. Young children are 
presented with age-appropriate versions of classic tasks, in which base-rate information conflicts 
with case-specific individuating information (e.g., the “lawyer-engineer” problem to examine use 
of the representativeness heuristic). For instance, participants may see a base-rate that contains 
more boy characters, though they may be told about a particular individual that likes to play with 
toys that, based on cultural gender stereotypes, girls typically like. Use of this heuristic seems to 
strengthen with development; 4-year-olds trend more toward base-rate use, while 5-year-olds 
begin to show a preference for the representativeness heuristic, which is further strengthened to 
nearly adult levels by 6 years of age (Gualtieri & Denison, 2018). A similar developmental 
difference has been observed in American children’s proclivity towards the fundamental 
attribution error. This error is indicated by a bias toward person-specific explanations of others’ 
behaviour that overlook the role of situational factors. By the age of 6, children endorse person-
specific explanations of others’ behaviour, similar to adults in Western societies. However, 4-
year-olds are not biased towards these explanations and instead stick more closely to the 
observed behavioural covariations (Seiver et al., 2013). These experiments suggest that heuristic 
reasoning strengthens during early childhood. 
 At first glance, it might seem surprising that younger children would stick more closely 
to statistical data in their decisions, particularly when older children and adults use heuristics in 
lieu of this objective, reliable data. However, from as early as infancy, children are quite adept at 
using statistical data in their reasoning (Aslin, Saffran, & Newport, 1998; Denison et al., 2006; 
Denison et al., 2013; Girotto et al., 2016; Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Téglás et al., 
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2007; Xu & Garcia, 2008). Thus, by 4 years of age, children are highly practiced at reasoning 
about base-rates and covariation data and this may be what allows them to effortlessly use this 
information in their judgements and decisions (e.g., Gualtieri & Denison, 2018). However, they 
are not as practiced at using particular kinds of socio-cultural information in their reasoning, 
such as trait and stereotype-based information (Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Boseovski et al., 2013; 
Gonzalez et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2007; Martin & Ruble, 2004; Trautner et al., 2005), and thus 
they do not apply heuristics based on them when making judgments and decisions. 
 Although 4-year-olds are still developing their reasoning about traits and stereotypes, 
they are very adept at using testimony information in their inferences. One of the most important 
sources of knowledge for very young children is the social transmission of facts and norms 
(Harris et al., 2018). By the preschool years, children can judge whether a particular speaker is a 
good source of knowledge by considering factors like their past accuracy, confidence, and 
expertise (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013; Pasquini et al., 2007; 
Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013).  
 Given that young children are so adept at identifying and learning from accurate 
testimony, it seems plausible that a bias to over-rely on such information might emerge very 
early in human ontogeny. On the other hand, children’s early emerging ability to skeptically 
evaluate social information (Harris et al., 2018; Mills, 2013) and their ability to integrate 
testimony with causal frequency information (Bridgers et al., 2016), suggest that they could 
succeed at integrating testimony with strong base-rate data. I tested these possibilities with 4- 
and 5-year-old children for two main reasons. First, 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, have the 
ability to make rational inferences with probabilistic testimony data (Koenig & Harris, 2005; 
Pasquini et al., 2007). Thus, this is the youngest age group that possesses the requisite abilities to 
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reason about testimony information in a taxi-cab problem. It is critical that the witnesses in the 
current problems are probabilistically accurate. If the witness is perfectly accurate (i.e., 100% 
correct) or inaccurate (i.e., 0% correct) at identifying colours, then there is no rational reason to 
integrate testimony and base-rate information, because children should always trust a perfectly 
accurate witness, or mistrust a perfectly inaccurate witness3. Second, including 5-year-olds 
allowed me to examine whether integrating testimony and base-rates or use of a testimony 
heuristic changes with age over this period or remains mostly stable.  
 Connecting the heuristics and biases and selective trust literatures has important 
implications for dual-process theories of cognition. Because heuristic strategies can result from 
learned associations (Stanovich et al., 2011) and 4-year-olds are very adept at learning from 
testimony, investigating children’s ability to consider this particular social information in 
conjunction with base-rates in early development sheds light on children’s reasoning more 
broadly. Using heuristics can be valuable, as they improve efficiency and are often effective, 
with the trade-off of introducing some systematic bias. However, applying a heuristic in 
inappropriate circumstances would be entirely ineffective. For instance, it would not be 
particularly useful to rely on a testimony heuristic (i.e., trust the information that a person 
provides rather than considering all available information) in cases where a person has proven 
unreliable in the past, particularly if other high-quality information is available. Thus, examining 
the circumstances in which children might over-rely on testimony is pivotal in establishing the 
pervasiveness of their bias, if it exists. In two experiments, I explored how 4- and 5-year-old 
children use testimony and base-rate information in tandem.  
 
                                               
3 For a 100% accurate witness, Pr(𝐵|𝑡 = 	𝐵) = (8)(.89)(8)(.89)2(@)(.79) = 1, so the correct behaviour is always to disregard the base-rate.   
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Experiment 5 
 Experiment 5 explored children’s use of base-rate and testimony information separately 
in three between-subjects conditions (the base-rate condition, the accurate testimony condition, 
and the inaccurate testimony condition) to assess baseline use of this information for later 
comparisons to Experiment 6. The base-rate condition presented children with a group of ten 
dogs, eight wearing one colour collar and two wearing another colour. I was interested in 
children’s use of this numerical information when guessing the collar colour of an unknown dog 
that was randomly sampled from the group. Based on previous work using similar types of 
paradigms, I predict that most children will choose the majority colour (Denison et al., 2013; 
Gualtieri & Denison, 2018).   
 There were also two accuracy conditions. Children in both accuracy conditions were 
introduced to a girl who liked to watch dogs in the park and identified the colours of six dogs’ 
collars as they caught a ball. Her accuracy at identifying colours differed across conditions: in 
the accurate condition, she was correct 5/6 times on the previous day, while in the inaccurate 
condition, she was correct 3/6 times on the previous day. Following the accuracy sequence, 
children were introduced to a dog whose collar colour was unknown, and the girl provided 
testimony regarding which colour she thought she saw. Children were then asked to make an 
inference about the colour of the collar.  
 I developed these novel accuracy conditions to facilitate comparisons with the adult taxi-
cab problem. I predict that most children should endorse the witness’ testimony in the accurate 
condition, though it is unclear if they will discredit her testimony in the inaccurate condition. 
Children have opted to rely on information provided by an inaccurate informant when it is the 
only available information, and thus there was no conflicting information from another informant 
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to rely on (Vanderbilt, Heyman, & Liu, 2014). Because the inaccurate testimony condition 
provides children with inaccurate information on its own, it was unclear if children would 
disregard the inaccurate witness.   
Methods 
Participants. 
  Prior to data collection, I established the criteria that I would stop testing children after I 
had obtained a full sample of 40 in each condition (see Table 6 for age and gender breakdown of 
participants in each condition). 120 children were included in the final analyses, with 20 four-
year-olds and 20 five-year-olds in each of three conditions. Six additional children were tested 
and excluded due to parental report of low English language exposure (n=3) or non-compliance 
(n=3).   
Table 6. Age and gender breakdown per condition in Experiment 5. 
 Mean age Female 
Base-rate 60.58 months 18 
Accurate condition 60.98 months 21 
Inaccurate condition 60.75 months 20 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 In three between-subjects conditions, children were told a story about a girl at a dog park 
via a PowerPoint presentation that was narrated live by an experimenter (see Figure 11 for an 
overview of the procedure).  
  In the base-rate condition, participants saw that there were ten dogs at the park wearing 
blue or yellow collars. Of the ten dogs, eight wore one colour (e.g., blue), and two wore the other 
colour (e.g., yellow). The experimenter counted the dogs and pointed out that more dogs were 
wearing one of the colours. Children were then asked to indicate which colour there was more of, 
and, depending on the child’s response, the experimenter agreed or disagreed with their choice 
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and stated that there were lots of dogs wearing blue and less wearing yellow. Children were then 
introduced to a dog at the park that day who was running away with a blanket covering its collar. 
Thus, the dog’s group membership was unknown. Children were asked to recall which colour 
there was more of, and, depending on the child’s response, the experimenter agreed or disagreed 
with their choice. The experimenter asked the child, “What colour is this one wearing?” The 
colour introduced first, the colour of majority collar, and the placement of the dogs in the base-
rate array were counterbalanced.  
 In the accuracy conditions, participants were told that a girl at the park liked to identify 
what colour each dog was wearing while the dog chased a ball. During the history phase, 
participants saw what colour the girl thought she saw, followed by the actual colour of each dog, 
for six dogs. The witness was accurate 5/6 times in the accurate condition, and 3/6 times in the 
inaccurate condition. Children were asked if the witness was good or not good at identifying 
colours. Depending on the child’s response, the experimenter agreed or disagreed with their 
choice: the experimenter stated the girl was good because she got five right and only one wrong 
(accurate), or stated that she was not very good because she got three right and three wrong, and 
was guessing (inaccurate). Children were then introduced to a dog at the park who was running 
away with a blanket covering its collar. Children were told what colour the girl thought the dog 
was wearing (i.e., “She saw it, so she says it’s wearing yellow”). After this, participants were 
asked to recall what colour the girl thought the dog was wearing and if she was good or not very 
good at identifying the colours before. Children were corrected if they misremembered this 
information. The experimenter then asked the child, “What colour is this one wearing?” The 
colour introduced first, the order of collar colours during the accuracy portion, the order of the 
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witness’ correct responses during the history phase, and the colour of the witness’ testimony 
were counterbalanced.  
 
Figure 11. Overview of procedure in Experiment 5. 
Results 
 Children were given a score of 1 if they chose the group that was indicated by the 
information they were given. That is, in the base-rate condition, children were given a score of 1 
Children were introduced to a girl 
at the park who was accurate 5/6 
times at identifying colours the 
previous day. 
Children saw that there were ten 
dogs at the park today, with eight 
wearing blue and two wearing 
yellow. The colour of the base-rate 
was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Children saw a dog from the group 
running away with a blanket 
covering its collar, making its 
colour unknown. In the accuracy 
conditions, children were told what 
colour the girl thought she saw. 
Children in the base-rate condition 
were given no additional 
information. After this, they were 
asked what colour they thought 







Children were introduced to a girl 
at the park who was accurate 3/6 





if they chose the majority group, and children in the accuracy conditions were given a score of 1 
if they chose the colour indicated by the witness.  
Table 7. Children’s use of base-rate and testimony information in Experiments 5 and 6. 
 Base-rate Testimony  
 n % n %  
Experiment 5      
     Base-rate condition 31 78%    
     Accurate condition   29 73%   
     Inaccurate condition   24 60%  
Experiment 6      
     Accurate no conflict 38 95% 38 95%  
     Accurate conflict 6 15% 34 85%  
     Inaccurate no conflict 36 90% 36 90%  
     Inaccurate conflict  26 65% 14 35%  
Note: n = 40 per condition.   
 
 I examined the base-rate condition separately from the accuracy conditions, given that 
children in this condition were responding to the question based on different information (see 
Table 7 for the means per condition). To explore any potential effect of age on responses, I 
conducted a logistic regression with children’s age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) which indicated no 
significant effects of age on performance4, Wald χ2(df = 1) = .143, p = .705. Children chose the 
majority colour at a rate higher than chance (M = .78, SD = .42, p = .001, binomial) 5.  
 I examined performance in the two accuracy conditions together to explore any potential 
effect of age. A logistic regression with accuracy condition (accurate, inaccurate) and children’s 
age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) in the model revealed no significant effects of condition, Wald 
χ2(df = 1) = 1.394, p = .238, or age, Wald χ2(df = 1) = .510, p = .475. Despite the lack of 
                                               
4 For all regression analyses across both experiments, I found similar effects (no changes in significance cut-offs) when age was 
treated continuously. 
5 I also explored children’s performance when they misremembered the information before the test question. Importantly, all 
children were corrected before moving on. In the base-rate condition, 6/40 participants misremembered the base-rate. In the 
accurate condition, 4/40 kids misremembered the witness’ accuracy and 5/40 misremembered her testimony. In the inaccurate 
condition, 3/40 kids misremembered the witness’ accuracy and 2/40 misremembered her testimony. Given that these numbers are 
so small, I did not perform any statistics, but it appears that children’s data were very similar to the rest of the group when this 
information was misremembered but then corrected. 
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condition effect, I explored children’s responses in each condition to establish the extent to 
which they relied on the testimony when it was the only available information. In the accurate 
condition, children chose the group indicated by the witness at a rate higher than chance (M = 
.73, SD = .45, p = .006, binomial), while performance in the inaccurate condition was not 
statistically different from chance (M = .60, SD = .50, p = .268, binomial).  
Discussion  
 To establish children’s baseline behaviour in our paradigm, Experiment 5 presented 4- 
and 5-year-old children with base-rate and testimony information separately. I observed no 
differences in performance as a function of children’s age. Children in the base-rate condition 
relied on the 8:2 base-rate information and selected the majority group in their inferences at rates 
higher than chance. In the testimony conditions, children’s responses did not significantly differ 
based on the witness’ accuracy. Children who were presented with testimony from an accurate 
witness used this information in their inferences at rates higher than chance. However, children 
who were given testimony from an inaccurate witness did not use this information at rates 
significantly higher than chance, though they did not completely discredit it, given mean use at 
60%. This finding is not particularly surprising because young children in previous studies were 
also willing to rely on testimony from an inaccurate informant in the absence of conflicting 
information (Bridgers et al., 2016; Vanderbilt et al., 2014).  
Experiment 6 
 The results of Experiment 5 provide context for interpreting children’s responses when 
they are presented with base-rate and testimony information together in the same problem. I 
manipulated the witness’ accuracy at identifying colours (accurate: correct 5/6 times; inaccurate: 
correct 3/6 times) and whether this aligned or conflicted with the base-rate of dogs (no conflict: 
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her testimony aligns with the majority; conflict: her testimony conflicts with the majority, as she 
states it is the minority colour) in a 2x2 between-subjects design. This design results in four 
between-subjects conditions: the accurate conflict condition, the inaccurate conflict condition, 
the accurate no conflict condition, and the inaccurate no conflict condition.  
 The accurate conflict condition corresponds with the classic adult problem, which is why 
it is critical for examining whether children demonstrate base-rate neglect or, unlike adults, 
respond mathematically normatively and integrate the information. The witness, who is 
approximately 83% accurate, thinks that the collar of the missing dog is, for example, yellow, 
although 80% of the dogs are wearing blue. According to Bayes’ Theorem, if children integrate 
the base-rate information with the witness’ accuracy, they should say that the dog is wearing blue 
45% of the time, as a group. If they rely exclusively on the witness’ accuracy, as adults do, they 
should say the dog is wearing yellow approximately 83% of the time.  
 In the inaccurate conflict condition, the witness, who has been correct just 50% of the 
time, believes that the collar is yellow, and 80% of the dogs are wearing blue. This condition 
examines whether children more heavily weigh the reliable information (i.e., the base-rate 
information) and override testimony when a witness has proven to be unreliable. If children 
entirely neglect base-rates in favor of testimony, even when the witness has a history of 
inaccuracy, then it is possible they will use her testimony at a rate similar to Experiment 5 (i.e., 
approximately 60% of the time).  
 The two no conflict conditions serve as reference points for children’s performance in 
this more complicated task. In the inaccurate no conflict condition, the witness is only 50% 
accurate and states that the collar is blue when 80% of the dogs are also wearing blue. This 
condition is included to rule out the possibility that children may reflexively provide the opposite 
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response to an inaccurate witness’ testimony, regardless of base-rates, when the problem 
becomes more complex and potentially harder to follow. Employing a shortcut to simply give the 
opposite response to the inaccurate witness would be irrational in this situation because the base-
rate information points in the same direction. The accurate no conflict condition should be 
entirely uncomplicated. The witness, who is correct 83% of the time, thinks that the collar is blue 
and 80% of the dogs are also wearing blue. In sum, children in both no conflict conditions should 
choose the colour endorsed by the witness and the base-rate information. These conditions also 
allowed me to assess whether having two converging pieces of information have an additive 
effect on children’s decisions. 
Methods 
Participants. 
I again tested 40 children in each condition. 160 children were included in the final 
analyses, with 20 four-year-olds and 20 five-year-olds in each of the four conditions (see Table 8 
for age and gender breakdown). Five additional children were tested and excluded because of 
interruption in the testing environment (contractors entered the room during testing; n=1) or non-
compliance (n=4). 
Table 8. Age and gender breakdown per condition in Experiment 6. 
 Mean age Female 
     Accurate no conflict 60.90 months 24 
     Accurate conflict 60.37 months 19 
     Inaccurate no conflict 60.65 months 21 
     Inaccurate conflict 60.80 months 24 
 
Materials and Procedure. 
 Participants were told that a girl at the park liked to identify what colour collar each dog 
was wearing while they chased a ball (see Figure 12 for an overview of the procedure). During 
the history phase, participants were told about the witness’ accuracy when identifying the colours 
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of 6 dogs on the previous day, using the same 5/6 or 3/6 accuracy rates as in the accuracy 
conditions for Experiment 5. Participants then saw a group of ten new dogs and were told that 
these dogs were at the park on the current day. The experimenter counted the dogs and 
established the majority (8:2) as in the base-rate condition of Experiment 5. Because children 
were presented with two pieces of information in Experiment 6, I included a recap slide where 
the experimenter reminded participants what colour there was more of at the park on the current 
day, and how accurate the witness was at identifying colours the previous day. Information was 
always recapped in this order, mimicking the structure of the typical adult taxi-cab problem. This 
recap reduced the memory demands of the task and replaced the questions that the experimenter 
previously asked the children (and corrected if they provided incorrect responses). Because 
children’s performance did not differ based on whether they misremembered this information or 
remembered correctly in Experiment 5, these questions were replaced with this recap slide to 
shorten the procedure while still ensuring that all children were reminded of the correct 
information. Children were then introduced to a dog at the park that day who was running away 
with a blanket covering its collar, making its group membership unknown. Children were told 
what colour the girl thought the dog was wearing (i.e., “She saw it, so she says it’s wearing 
yellow”). The experimenter then asked the child, “What colour is this one wearing?”. The colour 
introduced first, the order of collar colours during the accuracy portion, the order of the witness’ 
correct responses during the history phase, the colour of the majority collar, the placement of the 
dogs in the base-rate array, and the colour of the witness’ testimony were counterbalanced.  
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Figure 12. Overview of procedure in Experiment 6. 
 
Results 
 Children received a score of 1 if they selected the group indicated by the base-rate (in no 
conflict cases, this cues the same response as when coded by testimony). See Figure 13 for a 
graph of the means per condition.  
Children were introduced to a girl 
at the park who was either 
accurate 5/6 times (accurate 
condition, pictured) or 3/6 times 
(inaccurate condition) at 
identifying colours the previous 
day. 
Children saw that there were ten 
dogs at the park today, with eight 
wearing blue and two wearing 
yellow. The colour of the base-rate 
was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
To ensure that children could 
follow the paradigm, they were 
reminded of the base-rate and 
accuracy information. 
Children saw a dog from the group 
running away with a blanket 
covering its collar, making its 
colour unknown. Children were 
then told what colour the girl 
thought she saw. In the no conflict 
conditions, her testimony aligned 
with the base-rate. In the conflict 
conditions, her testimony 
conflicted with the base-rate. After 
this, they were asked what colour 









Figure 13. Proportion of children choosing the higher base-rate option in Experiment 6. 
 To explore children’s responses across conditions and any effects of age, I conducted a 
logistic regression with conflict condition (conflict, no conflict), accuracy condition (accurate, 
inaccurate), children’s age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds), and the interaction between conflict 
condition and accuracy condition included in the model. This revealed a significant main effect 
of conflict condition, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 35.273, p < .001, and an interaction between conflict and 
accuracy condition, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 8.662, p = .003, no main effect of accuracy condition, 
Wald χ2(df = 1) = 2.325, p = .127, and no main effect of age, Wald χ2(df = 1) = 0, p = 1. A 
Fisher’s exact test indicated that children’s use of base-rate information on conflict problems 
significantly differed based on the witness’ accuracy (p < .001).  
 To further examine children’s use of base-rate and testimony information, I compared 
children’s performance in Experiment 6 to the baseline conditions in Experiment 5 (see Table 7 
for a comparison of performance). I first explored children’s performance in the no conflict 
conditions. Testimony and base-rate information cued the same group in no conflict conditions, 






























responses were then compared to the baseline base-rate and testimony performance in 
Experiment 5 using Chi square analyses. In the accurate no conflict condition, children’s 
responses (M = .95, SD = .22) differed significantly from their base-rate use in Experiment 5 (M 
= .78, SD = .42; p = .048), and their use of testimony in the accurate condition in Experiment 5 
(M = .73, SD = .45; p = .013). This suggests that when the information converges and all 
information is reliable and relevant, there is an additive effect on children’s judgments.  
 In the inaccurate no conflict condition, children’s responses (M = .90, SD = .30) did not 
differ significantly from their base-rate use in Experiment 5 (M = .78, SD = .42; p = .225). 
However, children’s responses differed significantly from their use of testimony in the inaccurate 
condition of Experiment 5 (M = .60, SD = .50; p = .004). In this case, having the reliable base-
rate information coupled with the unreliable testimony led children to make stronger inferences 
than with unreliable testimony alone. The results from these conditions confirm that participants 
could follow the narrative in both accuracy conditions, and that they do not automatically 
disagree with an inaccurate witness.  
 I then examined children’s performance in the conflict conditions, in which testimony 
and base-rate information cued different groups. I first examined performance in the accurate 
conflict condition, which maps onto the classic adult taxi-cab problem. First, I examined if 
children’s responses were in line with an integration strategy that weighed both base-rate and 
accurate testimony information. If children were using this strategy, approximately 45% of 
participants should choose the group cued by the base-rate. However, I found that their 
performance significantly differed from this value (M = .15, SD = .36; binomial p < .001). I then 
examined whether children might be relying only on testimony using a Chi square: they relied on 
the testimony information in Experiment 6 (M = .85, SD = .36, coding reversed for comparison) 
 85 
at similar rates to Experiment 5 (M = .73, SD = .45; p = .274), suggesting that they were 
focusing on this information in Experiment 6. Altogether, these analyses are most consistent with 
the interpretation that children did not integrate base-rate and testimony information, neglected 
base-rates, and defaulted to testimony use. This is very similar to adult behaviour in the classic 
problem; adult judgments differ from the value that would be predicted if base-rates and 
testimony were integrated, and do not differ from the value that would be predicted if only 
witness accuracy was considered. 
 Next, I explored children’s performance in the inaccurate conflict condition to examine 
the pervasiveness of children’s reliance on testimony. In this condition, the inaccurate testimony 
conflicted with more reliable base-rate information, so reliance on testimony in this context 
would be ineffective. Children’s use of testimony information (M = .35 SD = .48) differed 
significantly from their use of testimony in Experiment 5, as they relied on the witness 
significantly more in their inferences in Experiment 5 (M = .60, SD = .49; p = .043). Thus, 
children were selective in their use of testimony when more reliable base-rate information was 
available. 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 6, I presented children with base-rate and testimony information in the 
same problem. I observed no effects of age. When both pieces of information aligned, children 
performed at near-ceiling levels, selecting the colour indicated by the base-rate and the witness. 
This effect appeared to be additive when both pieces of information were reliable. However, 
children over-relied on the accurate witness’ testimony when it conflicted with the base-rate, 
opting to use the testimony in their inferences in a similar manner as adults in the classic taxi-cab 
problem. Notably, this bias for testimony was not extended to the inaccurate witness. Whereas 
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relying on the accurate witness is reasonable, a bias toward the inaccurate witness’ testimony 
would be irrational due to her prior inaccuracy. When the inaccurate witness’ testimony 
conflicted with the base-rates, children were pulled more toward the base-rate information and 
did not reflexively rely on the testimony information.  
General Discussion 
 The current experiments explored how children reconcile information from witness 
testimony with base-rates and found that children selectively exhibited a testimony bias. At 
baseline, children relied on base-rate and accurate testimony information when they were 
presented separately in Experiment 5. However, children did not rely on the inaccurate witness’ 
testimony at rates higher than chance, though they did not completely discredit the information 
she provided. In Experiment 6, children were presented with base-rates and testimony 
information together. When both pieces of information cued the same response, children 
performed at near ceiling levels and selected the group that was suggested by both the base-rates 
and testimony. The pivotal conflict conditions presented children with conflicting base-rate and 
testimony information. When the witness was accurate, children were more likely to use her 
testimony in their inferences than the base-rates, and group level responses indicated no signs of 
integrating the evidence. This suggests that the same bias seen in adults is also present early in 
development. However, children’s preference for testimony information over base-rates was 
appropriately selective. Compared to the accurate conflict condition, children in the inaccurate 
conflict condition were pulled toward the group cued by the base-rates. Although they relied on 
the inaccurate witness’ testimony slightly more often than not when it was the only information 
available in Experiment 5, they downgraded this significantly when it conflicted with a 
 87 
meaningful base-rate in Experiment 6. Taken together, these findings suggest that children may 
use a testimony shortcut at very young ages, but they use it selectively. 
 Much previous work has established that young children reliably use base-rate (Denison 
et al., 2006; Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011) and accurate testimony (Harris et al., 2018; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007) information in their inferences. The current 
findings suggest that a bias in favor of testimony over base-rates emerges early in development, 
with young children, much like adults, over-relying on the information provided by an accurate 
but imperfect witness. On the surface, these findings appear to contrast with research on heuristic 
use in development that has suggested 4-year-olds rely on base-rate and covariation data in their 
inferences and that biases in favor of socio-cultural information strengthen with age (Gualtieri & 
Denison, 2018; Seiver et al., 2013). In the current experiment, a bias for testimony (and its 
resultant base-rate neglect) emerges earlier at 4-years of age, as opposed to 5- or 6-years. Why 
might we see such an early emergence of this adult-like behaviour? The tendency to neglect 
statistical base-rate information in favor of socio-cultural information may emerge at different 
ages depending on the socio-cultural information, reflecting differences in children’s dexterity 
with the social information at hand. Specifically, 4-year-olds are fine-tuning their understanding 
about the role of traits in predicting behaviour, though 5- and 6-year-old children are quite 
proficient in using this information (Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Boseovski et al., 2013; Gonzalez et 
al., 2010; Liu et al., 2007). However, evaluating the accuracy of testimony becomes practiced 
much earlier in development, as evidenced in 4-year-olds’ sophisticated inferences about 
probabilistically accurate informants (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007). Thus, the 
current findings provide additional insight into the nuances of young children’s abilities to 
reason about multiple sources of information.   
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 The findings of the current experiments are helpful in understanding the development of 
heuristic use and base-rate neglect. Notably, young children did not rely on the testimony of the 
inaccurate witness to the same extent as the accurate witness when her testimony conflicted with 
the base-rates. Children in the inaccurate testimony condition were pulled more toward base-
rates than those in the accurate testimony condition. Recent findings, in which children were 
presented with a single, inaccurate informant, have also found that children’s use of inaccurate 
testimony is contingent on the presence of conflicting information, which may facilitate their 
ability to weigh and contrast the information they are given (Bridgers et al., 2016; Vanderbilt et 
al., 2014). Children opted to rely on information provided by an inaccurate informant when it 
was the only available piece of information. However, children relied on a neutral informant, 
with no prior history of accuracy, who provided information that conflicted with the inaccurate 
informant (Vanderbilt et al., 2014). In the current experiments, children did not completely 
discredit the inaccurate witness, though they did not completely rely on her testimony when it 
was the only available information in Experiment 5. Similar to previous findings, when the 
inaccurate witness was paired with more reliable base-rate information, children trusted the 
inaccurate witness less when her testimony conflicted with the base-rate. Together with other 
recent findings on children’s ability to integrate testimony and causal frequency information 
(Bridgers et al., 2016), these findings suggest that young children can effectively weigh 
testimony information with other pieces of information.  
Conclusion 
 Chapter 4 presented findings that are the first to explore 4- and 5-year-old children’s use 
of base-rates in the presence of conflicting testimony information by presenting them with a 
child-friendly version of the taxi-cab problem. Though young children used a heuristic shortcut 
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to rely on the testimony of an accurate witness when it conflicted with base-rates, they were 
more selective in their use of inaccurate testimony. Because young children are quite 
sophisticated in their use of testimony and base-rate information early in development, the 
current findings have important implications for the development of heuristic thinking in 
children.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 In six experiments, I sought to examine the development of information integration and 
base-rate neglect in 4- to 6-year-old children. In Chapter 2, I examined the development of the 
representativeness heuristic. When base-rate and individuating information conflicted, 4-year-
olds trended more toward relying on base-rates in their inferences, though 5-year-olds trended 
toward individuating information, which was used at adult-like rates by the age of 6. In Chapter 
3, I further explored age differences in the performance of 4- and 6-year-olds. These results 
suggested that 4-year-olds focus more on the base-rate information, even in cases where it would 
be reasonable to rely on the individuating information. However, 6-year-olds seem to weigh the 
quality of the base-rate and individuating information, though they show a general bias toward 
the individuating information in their inferences. In Chapter 4, I explored 4- and 5-year-old 
children’s use of base-rates when it conflicted with a witness’ testimony. Children relied on the 
accurate witness’ testimony when it conflicted with the base-rates, but trended more toward 
base-rate use when the witness was inaccurate. Thus, even 4-year-olds neglected base-rates that 
conflicted with social information, suggesting that nuances in children’s base-rate neglect may 
lie in their experience with the socio-cultural information that conflicts with the base-rate.  
Implications for Dual Process Theories of Development  
 The current experiments present findings on the development of base-rate neglect from 
the youngest age group tested to date, offering important implications for dual process theories 
of cognition, which have had little data to work with regarding the emergence of heuristics and 
biases in development. Dual-process theories posit that decision-making relies on two different 
types of processing (Stanovich et al., 2011). Type 1 processing refers to relatively quick and 
computationally-efficient processes automatically activated by stimuli as the result of innate 
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modules or learned associations. In the lawyer-engineer problem, occupational stereotypes cued 
by the group information trigger Type 1 processing that may lead to a non-normative (often also 
referred to as heuristic) response. Type 2 processing refers to relatively slow and 
computationally-expensive processes that are deliberately employed. For instance, Type 2 
processes are used when properly integrating base-rate and individuating information to derive a 
normative (often also referred to as analytic) response. Both Type 1 and Type 2 processes rely on 
different mindware (e.g., strategies, rules, and procedures) relevant to different responses. In 
order to provide a non-normative response, the decision-maker must be aware of occupational 
stereotypes and how they are used to infer behaviour. In order to provide a normative response, 
the decision-maker must be aware of these social stereotypes but also use the correct strategy to 
integrate information.  
Considering the mindware young children have at a particular age is vital to 
understanding the emergence and strengthening of heuristics and biases. Heuristic and analytic 
strategies are fine-tuned as children learn new strategies and experience more opportunities to 
use them (Stanovich et al., 2011). Thus, depending on the Type 1 and 2 mindware required, both 
types of processing can improve with age. For instance, children acquire Type 1 strategies as 
they learn to rely on socio-cultural information, such as personal characteristics and testimony 
from others. Strategies based on this information strengthen with experience as children come to 
use this information in their inferences. Moreover, Type 2 analytic strategies also improve with 
age. Children acquire new strategies for integrating information, which can lead to analytical 
responses that appropriately weigh social and numerical information.  
 Initial work on the representativeness heuristic in children found an interesting 
developmental trend with young children producing more analytical responses than older 
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children and adults (Davidson, 1995; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991). However, recent findings have 
suggested that children use heuristics as soon as they are familiar with the social information at 
hand, as young children’s use of base-rates was contingent on their familiarity with the social 
stereotype (De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011). That is, 5-year-olds used base-rate information when 
they were presented with a problem that involved stereotypes about principals and construction 
workers, though they were less likely to use the base-rate when the problem contained 
stereotypes about boys and girls. From this work, it was speculated that children employed Type 
1 strategies as soon as they were familiar with the stereotypes tested.  
 However, from the current findings, it is evident that familiarity with group information 
is not the sole determinant of its use. Recall that 4-year-olds relied on traits and gender 
stereotypes in their inferences when it was the only available information in the problem. 
Although children of this age can make inferences based on individuating information, I found 
that 4-year-olds produced responses that were more aligned with the base-rate information when 
both pieces of information were presented. Children’s use of individuating information is quite 
pronounced by the age of 6, with children relying on the individuating information at similar 
rates as adults in the conflict problems in Chapter 2. Moreover, in Chapter 3, 6-year-olds 
continued to rely on individuating information in their inferences when it characterized social 
information that was less practiced. Thus, heuristic responses based on individuating information 
were strengthened within a period of two years, suggesting that a mechanism of children’s 
general cognition might contribute to this preference apart from their familiarity with the social 
information at hand. Between the ages of 4 and 6, children form a strong theory about the role of 
personal characteristics in predicting behaviour. This is supported by findings on the 
fundamental attribution error in young children, which have uncovered a similar age difference 
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between 4 and 6-year-olds, further establishing that by the age of 6, young children have formed 
a strong theory about what information is useful in predicting and explaining behaviours (Seiver 
et al., 2013).     
 The performance of 4-year-olds is quite interesting: although they are familiar with the 
individuating information, they opted to rely on the base-rates. Moreover, findings from Chapter 
3 suggest that 4-year-olds may be in fact over-relying on base-rate information. When given an 
equal base-rate, 4-year-olds were pulled toward chance performance, even though it would have 
been reasonable to rely exclusively on the individuating information in this case. Thus, at this 
age, children may have not formed a strong theory about the importance of personal 
characteristics in predicting and explaining behaviour (Seiver et al., 2013). While they are 
developing this theory, 4-year-olds are more open to the observed data than older children and 
adults who hold strong prior beliefs that pull them away from the observations (Lucas et al., 
2014). Because even infants are sensitive to numerical and statistical data (Denison & Xu, 2014; 
Saffran & Kirkham, 2018), children’s proficiency in using base-rate information may lead to its 
overuse in some contexts. Four-year-olds’ base-rate use also provides further insight on the 
distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes. The ease with which 4-year-olds rely on base-
rate information provides support for the recent argument that base-rate reasoning can be 
automatically activated, and as quick and computationally efficient, as a Type 1 process 
(Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014).  
 However, children’s use of a particular strategy depends on the information presented, 
highlighting the differential emergence of base-rate neglect across problems. That is, although 4-
year-olds relied on base-rates in variants of the lawyer-engineer problem, they neglected base-
rates when it conflicted with accurate testimony information in Chapter 4. Similar to how 6-year-
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olds seem to have acquired a general preference for personal characteristics, this suggests that 4-
year-olds are quite practiced in using accurate testimony information in their inferences and see 
it as more diagnostic than base-rates. Because 4-year-olds quite skillfully compare the accuracy 
of speakers to determine who to learn from (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007), the 
emergence of a biased Type 1 process seems contingent on children’s acuity with the socio-
cultural information available in the problem.  
Children’s Ability to Integrate Information 
 Finally, the current findings offer insight on the development of a more sophisticated 
ability to integrate social and numerical information. It should be noted that although base-rate 
use closely resembles normative responses, the correct response is to weigh the base-rate and 
social information using a computation that would require Type 2 processing. Due to the nature 
of a forced-choice dependent variable, the current studies could not directly investigate 
children’s information integration abilities. This point is made clear when interpreting the 
performance of 4-year-olds in Chapter 3, who performed around chance in the equal base-rate 
condition. It is unclear if 4-year-olds were integrating base-rate and individuating information, 
over relying on base-rate information, or if this trend was related to noise in their responses. 
 Although the dependent measure is limiting, comparing children’s responses across 
different conditions can provide initial insight on the development of children’s ability to weigh 
information. For instance, 4- and 5-year-old children in Chapter 4 chose to rely on the accurate 
witness when her testimony conflicted with the base-rate, though they were selective in their use 
of testimony and did not rely on the inaccurate witness when she conflicted with base-rates. 
Though children used the inaccurate witness’ testimony in their inferences more often than not 
when it was the only information available to them in the problem, the fact that children opted to 
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rely on the base-rate information suggests that they are weighing the accuracy of the witness 
with the reliable base-rates (Bridgers et al., 2016). Moreover, 6-year-old children seemed to 
weigh the strength of the individuating information in Chapter 3, opting to rely on base-rates 
when the individuating information was less informative. Although this suggests 6-year-olds are 
attempting to integrate base-rate and individuating information, recall that they neglected base-
rates in the irrelevant individuating condition and no individuating condition in Chapter 2, which 
highlights an issue in their ability to integrate information in those conditions. These questions 
are open to investigation, where perhaps a more continuous dependent measure could uncover 
nuances in children’s information integration abilities that may have been overlooked.  
Limitations 
  One limitation of the current design is the forced-choice response method. In the adult 
paradigm, participants are asked to estimate the likelihood that an individual is, for example, an 
engineer, or to rate the likelihood that the taxi-cab is blue, using a percent value (Bar-Hillel, 
1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). I used a binary choice paradigm to ensure that young children were able to 
provide a response; children this age cannot estimate likelihoods using percent values and face 
issues providing relevant explanations for their thought processes. Previous work with young 
children has indicated that an individual child’s responses over repeated trials tend to reflect the 
group distribution as a whole, suggesting that aggregating responses across a group of children in 
a forced-choice paradigm reliably represents an individual child’s beliefs (Denison et al., 2013). 
A binary response is also desirable from an ecological validity perspective because regardless of 
certainty, people ultimately make categorical decisions. Although this forced choice approach is 
typical of developmental studies of judgment and decision-making, a dichotomous dependent 
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variable is limiting in terms of sensitivity. In Chapter 3, I attempted to develop a continuous 
measure from children’s binary responses and their confidence in their response. Although I 
found that these scores replicated the general trends captured by the binary measure, it did not 
offer any additional insight on children’s ability to integrate information, possibly due to issues 
with children’s interpretation of the confidence question in which most children indicated they 
were guessing. In fact, it is reasonable that children indicated they were guessing on this 
question, since they could not be sure that their answer was correct (as they were not shown what 
activity the child in the story completed). Future studies could employ a rating scale to obtain 
more sensitive and graded judgments, providing additional insight into children’s degree of 
belief in a particular choice. Developing a measure that better captures the degree of children’s 
responses will aid future investigations, perhaps uncovering trends that were masked by the use 
of a binary dependent measure.  
 The final two limitations acknowledge plausible alternative accounts for the current age 
differences. First, it is possible that age differences in children’s sensitivity to pragmatics may 
have accounted for some of the developmental trends observed between 4- and 6-year-olds. 
Adults that are presented with the lawyer-engineer problem have argued that they felt inclined to 
rely on the individuating information because of demand characteristics. That is, when an adult is 
presented with background base-rate information and then a lengthy description of the 
individual, they feel that the experimenter is imploring them to use that individuating 
information in their inferences. In fact, altering pragmatic aspects of the problem affects adults’ 
strategy use (Schwarz et al., 1991; Zukier & Pepitone, 1984). I modeled my problems after the 
original work, which contains the pragmatic features that adults sometimes find problematic. 
Because of this design, children’s sensitivity to pragmatics may have prompted use of 
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individuating information in 6-year-olds, while an insensitivity to these features could have 
facilitated base-rate use in 4-year-olds. Between the ages of 4 and 6, children undergo drastic 
changes in their sensitivity to conversational pragmatics (Matthews, 2014). For example, 6-year-
olds’, but not 4-year-olds’, sensitivity to the quality manipulation in Chapter 3 was interpreted as 
a development in sensitivity to information quality. However, these data could also be viewed as 
evidence for a pragmatic account. Because the lower quality individuating information was also 
much shorter, it might be seen as less heavy-handed, which could reduce its use if children are 
attuned to this pragmatic feature. To tease apart this alterative account, future work could present 
children with these problems and a measure of their pragmatic development to see whether 
better-developed pragmatic reasoning predicts heuristic use. One could also examine if 
experimentally manipulating pragmatic features of the problem affects 6-year-olds’ use of 
individuating information.   
 Second, age differences in children’s cognitive abilities could account for developmental 
trends related to their strategy use. Children’s executive functions (e.g., working memory, 
inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility) undergo drastic developments during the early 
childhood years (Diamond, 2013; Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008). When adapting adult tasks for 
children, one must capture the essence of the adult task while ensuring it is age-appropriate for a 
developmental population (Stanovich et al., 2011). In order to preserve the structure of the 
original problems, I presented children with problems that were somewhat complicated; children 
had to track the narrative, along with the numerical and social information, and needed to keep 
this information in mind in order to respond to the test question. Somewhat counterintuitively, 
less sophisticated cognitive abilities of 3- and 4-year-olds may facilitate their ability to learn 
from observed data, as evidenced in their tendency to maximize probabilistic information 
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(Thompson-Schill, Ramscar, & Chrysikou, 2009). Moreover, executive functions play a role in 
determining the strategies children use to solve physical reasoning (Baker, Gjersoe, Sibielska-
Woch, Leslie, & Hood, 2011; Bascandziev, Powell, Harris, & Carey, 2016) and theory of mind 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002) problems. Future work could 
formally test this relationship, uncovering how features of children’s cognition, such as their 
executive functions, affect their approach to integrating base-rate and social information.  
Future Directions 
 The current findings emphasize that the development of heuristics and biases is 
considerably more nuanced than previously thought. Much future work is needed to understand 
the emergence and strengthening of these strategies over the course of development. Uncovering 
the conditions that facilitate base-rate use may aid in the design of interventions that aim to 
improve sensitivity to numerical information.  
 Much work in the adult literature has focused on the conditions that elicit base-rate use. 
One feature of the problem that affects adults’ use of base-rates is emphasizing the role of 
random sampling. That is, when random sampling is highlighted in the problem, adults tend to 
incorporate base-rates in their judgments (Koehler, 1996). Notably, infants and young children 
are sensitive to sampling information in their probabilistic inferences (Denison et al., 2006; 
Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011; Xu & Denison, 2009). Because human decision-makers 
are sensitive to sampling information quite early in development, it is possible that manipulating 
this feature of the problem would affect children’s base-rate use, notably in cases where children 
may opt to rely on social information. Follow-up work could present children with a 
manipulation that specifies how the case was sampled. For instance, in an adaptation of the 
lawyer-engineer problem, participants could be told that the teacher drew the student’s name out 
 99 
of a hat (random sampling), or that the teacher selected her favourite student (non-random 
sampling).   
 Moreover, adults utilize base-rate information if the base-rates can be incorporated into 
their causal schema of the problem space (Ajzen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 
2007). For instance, in the taxi-cab problem, adults incorporate the base-rate information into 
their judgments if the base-rate contains causal information, such as the rate of accidents that 
each company has been involved in. Sensitivity to causal information also emerges early in 
childhood as children actively construct causal representations of the world around them (Gopnik 
et al., 2004). Exploring the ways in which causal models facilitate children’s ability to integrate 
social and numerical information would provide insight fruitful to the design of interventions. An 
adapted version of the taxi-cab problem from Chapter 4 that may better fit children’s causal 
model would be particularly illuminating. Instead of a population base-rate, children could be 
shown an 8:2 base-rate of the fastest dogs at the park, indicating that one colour tends to signify 
the faster dogs. If this information better suits children’s causal model, they should rely more 
heavily on the base-rate in their inferences when it conflicts with the accurate witness.  
 Developing a paradigm that more closely resembles real-world problems would provide 
additional insight on children’s ability to use social and numerical information on a daily basis. 
Recent work has also found that adults make accurate predictions about everyday phenomena, 
suggesting that they have intuitive theories about prior probabilities (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 
2006). It would be interesting to explore if children similarly hold accurate beliefs about prior 
probabilities and how they integrate this information in their judgements. For instance, children 
may hold prior beliefs about the ratio of nice to mean people in the world, as a higher proportion 
of people are consistently nice. In Chapter 2, participants were presented with a base-rate of nice 
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and mean robots, which was heavily skewed toward mean characters for half of the participants. 
Presenting children with a problem that explores their use of a natural population base-rate 
would elucidate how they come to use this information in the everyday inferences. Moreover, 
base-rates that contain information about a population may be less salient in children’s early 
learning environments than those that track the behaviour of an individual (e.g., a base-rate of 
how many times a particular child plays with gender-stereotypical girl toys and boy toys). 
Examining children’s use of base-rates in more naturalistic contexts would aid in uncovering 
how they come to use this information in their everyday environments.  
Implications 
  Learning, and employing, a heuristic by the age of 6 is quite remarkable. Even though it 
can introduce some systematic bias, heuristic reasoning is efficient and often effective. The 
emergence and strengthening of biases between the ages of 4 and 6 suggests an interesting 
opportunity for an age at which intervening on the use of heuristics could be particularly 
effective. In the tradition of previous experiments that have employed statistical reasoning 
interventions to improve adult judgments and decision-making (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986), 
some intuitive hands-on training with these very young children could go a long way. 
Demonstrating to children the errors that can arise when base-rate information is not adequately 
considered could help children have better intuitions about everyday problems that involve 
weighing social and statistical information. 
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